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Chanak Crisis

The Chanak Crisis (Turkish: Çanakkale Krizi), also called the Chanak Affair and the Chanak Incident, was a war scare in September 1922 between the United Kingdom and the Government of the Grand National Assembly in Turkey. Chanak refers to Çanakkale, a city on the Anatolian side of the Dardanelles Strait. The crisis was caused by Turkish efforts to push the Greek armies out of Turkey and restore Turkish rule in the Allied-occupied territories, primarily in Constantinople (now Istanbul) and Eastern Thrace. Turkish troops marched against British and French positions in the Dardanelles neutral zone. For a time, war between Britain and Turkey seemed possible, but Canada refused to agree as did France and Italy. British public opinion did not want a war. The British military did not either, and the top general on the scene, Sir Charles Harington, refused to relay an ultimatum to the Turks because he counted on a negotiated settlement. The Conservatives in Britain's coalition government refused to follow Liberal Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who with Winston Churchill was calling for war.[2]

The crisis quickly ended when Turkey, having overwhelmed the Greeks, agreed to a negotiated settlement that gave it the territory it wanted. Lloyd George's mishandling of the crisis contributed to his downfall via the Carlton Club meeting. The crisis raised the issue of who decided on war for the British Empire, and was Canada's first assertion of diplomatic independence from London. Historian Robert Blake says the Chanak Crisis led to Arthur Balfour's definition of Britain and the dominions as "autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of the domestic or internal affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations". In 1931 the UK Parliament enacted Balfour's formula into law through the Statute of Westminster 1931.[3]

Consequences[edit]

Lloyd George's rashness resulted in the calling of a meeting of Conservative MPs at the Carlton Club on 19 October 1922, which passed a motion that the Conservative Party should fight the next general election as an independent party. This decision had dire ramifications for Lloyd George, as the Conservative Party made up the vast majority of the 1918–1922 post-war coalition. Indeed, they could have made up the majority government if it were not for the coalition.


Lloyd George also lost the support of the influential Lord Curzon, who considered that the Prime Minister had been manoeuvring behind his back. Following the Carlton Club decision Lloyd George resigned as Prime Minister, never to hold office again.[11] Although many expected a new coalition to be formed under a Conservative Prime Minister, the Conservatives, under returned party leader Bonar Law, subsequently won the 1922 general election with an overall majority.


British and French forces were ultimately withdrawn from the neutral zone in summer 1923, following the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne.


The Chanak Crisis fundamentally challenged the assumption that the Dominions would automatically follow Britain into war. The crisis changed the relations between the Dominions and London, paving the way for the Statute of Westminster 1931, which explicitly declared that the Dominions had the power to declare war.

Adelson, Roger. London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, and War, 1902–1922 (1995) pp 207–11

Darwin, J. G. "The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet", History (1980) 65#213 pp 32–48.

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Ferris, John. "'Far too dangerous a gamble'? British intelligence and policy during the Chanak crisis, September–October 1922." Diplomacy and Statecraft (2003) 14#2 pp: 139–184.

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Ferris, John. "Intelligence and diplomatic signalling during crises: The British experiences of 1877–78, 1922 and 1938." Intelligence and National Security (2006) 21#5 pp: 675–696.

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Laird, Michael. "Wars averted: Chanak 1922, Burma 1945–47, Berlin 1948." Journal of Strategic Studies (1996) 19#3 pp: 343–364. DOI:10.1080/01402399608437643

Mowat, Charles Loch., Britain Between The Wars 1918-1940 (1955) pp 116–19, 138.

Sales, Peter M. "WM Hughes and the Chanak Crisis of 1922." Australian Journal of Politics & History (1971) 17#3 pp: 392–405.

Steiner, Zara. The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933 (Oxford History of Modern Europe) (2005) pp 114–19

Walder, David. The Chanak Affair (Macmillan, 1969)