The relationship has been complex and controversial due to the dispute on the political status of Taiwan after the administration of Taiwan was transferred from Japan to the Republic of China at the end of World War II in 1945, and the subsequent split between the PRC and ROC as a result of the Chinese Civil War. The essential question is whether the two governments are still in a civil war over One China, each holding within one of two "regions" or parts of the same country (e.g. "1992 Consensus"), whether they can be unified under a "one country, two systems" framework, or whether they are now separate countries (either as "Taiwan" and "China" or Two Chinas). The English expression "cross-strait relations" is considered to be a neutral term that avoids reference to the political status of either side.
At the end of World War II in 1945, the administration of Taiwan was transferred to the Republic of China (ROC) from the Empire of Japan, though legal questions remain regarding the language in the Treaty of San Francisco. In 1949, with the Chinese Civil War turning decisively in favor of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Republic of China government, led by the Kuomintang (KMT), retreated to Taiwan and established the provisional capital in Taipei, while the CCP proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing. No armistice or peace treaty has ever been signed and debate continues as to whether the civil war has legally ended.[3]
Since then, the relations between the governments in Beijing and Taipei have been characterized by limited contact, tensions, and instability. In the early years, military conflicts continued, while diplomatically both governments competed to be the "legitimate government of China". Since the democratization of Taiwan, the question regarding the political and legal status of Taiwan has shifted focus to the choice between political unification with mainland China or de jure Taiwanese independence. The PRC remains hostile to any formal declaration of independence and maintains its claim over Taiwan.
At the same time, non-governmental and semi-governmental exchanges between the two sides have increased. In 2008, negotiations began to restore the Three Links (postal, transportation, trade) between the two sides, cut off since 1949. Diplomatic contact between the two sides has generally been limited to Kuomintang administrations on Taiwan. However, during Democratic Progressive Party administrations, negotiations continue to occur on practical matters through informal channels.[4]
Economy[edit]
China is Taiwan's most important target of outward foreign direct investment.[163] From 1991 to 2022, more than US$200 billion have been invested in China by Taiwanese companies.[164] Much of Taiwanese-owned manufacturing, particularly in the electronics sector and the apparel sector, occurs in the PRC.[165]: 11 The investments helped the Taiwanese economy but also propelled China's economic rise.[166]
China is also Taiwan's largest trading partner, accounting for over 20 percent of total trade.[167] China and Hong Kong account for over 30 percent of Taiwan's exports. In 2022, Taiwan's trade surplus with mainland China and Hong Kong amounted to $100.4 billion.[168] Electronic components, including semiconductor chips, lead in Taiwan's total exports to China.[169]
Since the governments on both sides of the strait do not recognize the other side's legitimacy, there is a lack of legal protection for cross-strait economic exchanges. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was viewed as providing legal protection for investments.[170] In 2014, the Sunflower Student Movement effectively halted the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA).
Neither China nor Taiwan is comfortable with mutual economic dependence, and each government has been driven to seek alternatives.[171] Since 2016, Taiwan has tried to reduce its economic reliance on mainland China through its New Southbound Policy – in 2022 Taiwan's total investments in the countries targeted by the policy outstripped investments in China for the first time.[172] The number of Taiwanese working in China also fell. In 2015, 58 percent of Taiwanese working outside Taiwan worked in mainland China, with a total number of 420,000 people.[173] In 2021, the number fell to 163,000, accounting for 51.1 percent of the 319,000 Taiwanese who worked overseas.[174]
In 2021, China banned pineapple imports from Taiwan, citing the risk of “harmful creatures” that could affect its own crops. The Taiwanese government characterized the ban as a Chinese campaign to ramp up political pressure on Taiwan. Similar to the Australian barley and wine incident, China was accused of "using ambiguous and opaque trade policies to punish its rivals." As a reaction to the ban, Taiwanese politicians and allies promoted Taiwanese pineapples as freedom pineapples.[175]
Cultural exchanges[edit]
The National Palace Museum in Taipei and the Palace Museum in Beijing have collaborated on exhibitions.[176] Scholars and academics frequently visit institutions across the Taiwan Strait.[177] Books published on each side are regularly re-published in the other side. However, restrictions on direct imports, different writing systems, and censorship somewhat impede the exchange of books and ideas.[178][179] Some cultural exchanges are even accused of being associated with China's united front work.[180][181]
Taiwanese students can apply to universities in the mainland China without taking China's nationwide unified examination, called Gaokao.[182] There are regular programs for school students from each side to visit the other.[183][184] In 2019, there were 30,000 mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students studying in Taiwan.[185] There were also more than 7,000 Taiwanese students studying in Hong Kong that same year.[186]
Religious exchange has become frequent. Frequent interactions occur between worshipers of Matsu, and also between Buddhists.[187][188] Taiwan Buddhist organization Tzu Chi is the first overseas non-governmental organization allowed to operate in China.[189]
Humanitarian actions[edit]
Both sides have provided humanitarian aid to one another on several occasions. Following the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, an expert search and rescue team was sent from Taiwan to help rescue survivors in Sichuan. Shipments of aid material were also provided under the coordination of the Red Cross Society of the Republic of China and charities such as Tzu Chi.[190]
Following the 2023 Jishishan earthquake, Taiwanese President Tsai expressed her condolences and offered humanitarian aid to the PRC.[191] Tsai expressed her condolences in official remarks, as well as in a simplified character post on X.[192]
Public opinion[edit]
China[edit]
A survey conducted between 2020 and 2021 showed that 55 percent of the respondents accepted launching a unification war to take back Taiwan entirely while 33 percent of them opposed.[207] 22 percent of the respondents accepted the two sides of the Taiwan Strait keeping separate political systems, with unification not necessarily being the end game. Another survey conducted in 2022 showed Chinese respondents were split between those favoring tough policies on Taiwan and those favoring friendly ones.[208]
Young jingoistic Chinese nationalists on the internet, also called Little Pink, occasionally bypassed the Great Firewall to flood websites with messages and stickers in protest against Taiwan independence.[209][210][211]