Censorship in China
Censorship in the People's Republic of China is mandated by the PRC's ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is one of the strictest censorship regimes in the world.[1] The government censors content for mainly political reasons, such as curtailing political opposition, and censoring events unfavorable to the CCP, such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, pro-democracy movements in China, the persecution of Uyghurs in China, human rights in Tibet, Falun Gong, pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since Xi Jinping became the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (de facto paramount leader) in 2012, censorship has been "significantly stepped up".[2]
This article is about censorship in the People's Republic of China. For censorship in the Republic of China (Taiwan), see Censorship in Taiwan.
The government has censorship over all media capable of reaching a wide audience. This includes television, print media, radio, film, theater, text messaging, instant messaging, video games, literature, and the internet. The Chinese government asserts that it has the legal right to control the Internet's content within their territory and that their censorship rules do not infringe on their citizens' right to free speech.[3] Government officials have access to uncensored information via an internal document system.
As of 2023, the World Press Freedom Index ranks China as the country with the second least press freedom in the world after North Korea.[4] In August 2012, the OpenNet Initiative classified Internet censorship in China as "pervasive" in the political and conflict/security areas and "substantial" in the social and Internet tools areas, the two most extensive classifications of the five they use.[5] Freedom House ranks the Chinese press as "not free", the worst possible ranking, saying that "state control over the news media in China is achieved through a complex combination of party monitoring of news content, legal restrictions on journalists, and financial incentives for self-censorship,"[6] and an increasing practice of "cyber-disappearance" of material written by or about activist bloggers.[7]
Other views suggest that Chinese businesses such as Baidu, Tencent and Alibaba, some of the world's largest internet enterprises, have benefited from the way China blocked international rivals from the domestic market.[8]
Background[edit]
In the Republican China period, the earliest known instance of Chinese censorship was in 1941 when the second volume of the book "Inside Asia", by John Gunther, was banned by the Nationalist government.[9]
Following the 1942-1943 American dollar bond scandal, Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek blocked newspapers from publishing the corruption allegations against finance minister H.H. Kung, also one of Chiang's relatives through marriage.[10]: 75–79
According to Reporters without Borders’ report Sixty Years of News Media and Censorship, diversity of views and privately-owned media were eliminated in 1949 when the CCP took control of China, bringing editorial freedom to a complete end. The official Chinese press serves as the CCP's “mouth and tongue” as well as its "eyes and ears."[11]
The People's Republic of China adopted the "Economic Reform" policy in 1978, which transformed China's economic structure from a planned economy to a market economy. To stimulate the economy, the Chinese government relaxed its control on media, which promoted media commercialization, profits, and growth.[12] The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests were a turning point for Chinese censorship, especially after they were forcibly suppressed on 4 June 1989 following a declaration of martial law and People's Liberation Army troops being deployed, and the Chinese government was condemned internationally. Following the protests and subsequent massacre, news censorship was strengthened because government officials considered that free media had promoted the "turmoil" and represented a potential threat to the regime.[12] After 1995, the Chinese government expanded internet access because it thought that a developed internet would have a positive effect on economic growth; it simultaneously adopted strategic censorship to control information.[12]
The CCP Propaganda Department (中共中央宣传部; CCPPD) is the main official institution responsible for censorship work. Other departments, for example the State Council Information Office and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (formerly known as the Ministry of Culture until 2018), assist with censorship work.[12] In 2013, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping upgraded the Internet censorship department and established the Cyberspace Administration of China (中央网络安全和信息化委员会办公室; CAC), an independent network regulation agency.[12]
The Chinese government censors the domestic internet community and foreign websites differently. For the domestic internet community, the propaganda department governs what type of content should be banned or deleted on the internet, and the system of social media or website conduct self-censorship which automatically filters all sensitive content.[12] Censors review the posts on social media, and the users must register by their real name. For foreign websites, the "Great Firewall" prevents Chinese citizens from accessing particular websites with sensitive content by blocking the IP address of these websites.[12] Meanwhile, some foreign websites are not blocked, but the government extends the loading time for these websites.[12] By 2020, an estimated 12 million to 20 million Chinese internet users were using Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to bypass the internet blockade.[13] In accordance with "Implementation Rules for Provisional Regulations of the Administration of International Networking of Computer Information in the People's Republic of China" (中华人民共和国计算机信息网络国际联网管理暂行规定), the Chinese government does not support Internet users who use VPN to bypass Internet censorship and visit blocked websites within the Chinese mainland.[13] In principle, it is forbidden for Internet users to use a VPN, but if they only do so without selling VPNs or making profits, the government will not investigate.[13]
Goals[edit]
Most broadly, the purpose of the censorship apparatus is to maintain the stability of the status quo system of governance under the CCP.[14] This includes political censorship as well as censorship of content deemed obscene and harmful to public morality, although the latter justification can be used as a means to censor political topics as well.[15] The more specific reasoning and logic of censorship is not publicized by the state, however; scholars outside of China generally tend to take two overarching views of its purpose: first, censorship primarily targets unauthorized criticisms of the party-state; and/or second, censorship primarily targets expression of sentiment that is conducive to organization of collective action (whether or not it is critical of the party-state).[16]
In 2013, Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts published research based on large-scale sampling of posts on a variety of Chinese social media, arguing that the primary motive for censorship is to quash potential for collective action, and not prevent criticism of the government per se. Through regular, automated sampling of extant posts, the authors were able to analyze which were deleted over time.[17] While drawing only from Internet-based sources, King et al. argued their data demonstrated that "despite widespread censorship of social media, we find that when the Chinese people write scathing criticisms of their government and its leaders, the probability that their post will be censored does not increase. Instead, we find that the purpose of the censorship program is to reduce the probability of collective action by clipping social ties whenever any collective movements are in evidence or expected."[18][19]
Further experiments conducted by King et al. (2014) demonstrated and recreated mechanisms of censorship of social media.[20] The authors created social media accounts to publish text online, tracking what was and was not deleted, and additionally obtained social media censorship software used by private corporations to comply with government regulations. King et el. again argued their work offered "rigorous support for the recent hypothesis that criticisms of the state, its leaders, and their policies are published, whereas posts about real-world events with collective action potential are censored."[21]
In 2019, however, Dimitar Gueorguiev and Edmund Malesky published an analysis of the data gathered in King, Pan & Roberts (2013), arguing that the sample included critical posts garnered through state-led consultation campaigns, wherein the Chinese government specifically solicited public comment on certain proposals, laws and regulations. Gueorguiev and Malesky subsequently concluded that controlling for such condoned criticism, the "strong" thesis of King, Pan & Roberts (2013)—that collective action potential is the primary trigger of censorship, and not a criticism of the government—failed to stand. Rather, while collective action may be a strong, or the strongest, condition for censorship, general criticism is also a major target as well.[22]
In 2017, Bei Qin, David Strömberg, and Yanhui Wu published an article titled "Why Does China Allow Freer Social Media? Protests versus Surveillance and Propaganda." This article, based on King, Pan, and Roberts' argument, explores the Chinese government's censorship goals by analyzing data from Chinese social media site Sina Weibo. Qin et al. also point out that the Chinese government can monitor and predict upcoming collective action events, and can ask local governments to intervene and prevent violent conflicts. Qin et al. state that "Governments can use these methods to track and analyze online activities, to gauge public opinion, and to contain threats before they spread."[23] Qin et al. also note that the central government limits its censorship to encourage people to express their opinions about the government's performance and public policies. Therefore, the government can receive feedback from the internet, which helps officials to get to know local issues and improve their work.[21] Also, this article discusses some posts on Weibo that have accused local officials of corruption, which means some corruption cases can be predicted on social media, and the central government can supervise the local officials on the internet.[24]
Chinese scholars Liu Liming and Sheng Qiwen state that censorship helps to protect national information security as well as prevent in the disclosure and infringement of any important national or personal information.[25] Song Minlei points out that censorship is conducive to the maintenance of China's "ideological security."[26] Internet censorship, Song writes, can protect the mainstream ideology, such as the core socialist value system, prevent the spread of harmful information abroad, and maintain national political stability.[27]
Mechanisms[edit]
Party and state bodies[edit]
Multiple organs of both the CCP and the Chinese state exercise various degrees of responsibility for censorship.
The Publicity Department of the CCP plays a major role in censorship. It issues editorial guidelines for media nationwide, delineating topics that cannot be covered or must be covered in a certain way.[28] In 2013, The Beijing News, a CCP-run newspaper, noted that the Publicity Department employed over 2 million 'public sentiment analysts' (Chinese: 舆情分析师; pinyin: yúqíng fēnxī shī) across the country, who monitor comments on particular topics on the Chinese Internet and compile reports for relevant government or Party bodies if discussion crosses certain thresholds, which in turn decide if and how to respond.[29][30] Additionally, the Cyberspace Administration of China, another Party body, monitors and censors Internet-based media and speech, and issues guidelines to online platforms outlining priorities for controlling discourse.[31]
In 2018, a number of agencies underwent a reorganization designed to strengthen CCP control of media.[32] Most of the duties of the General Administration of Press and Publication (previously the State Administration for Press Publishing Radio Film & Television), which licensed and censored all content publishers within China, including in print, audio, and online formats, were taken over by the new National Radio and Television Administration under the authority of the State Council.[32] Film and press work was transferred directly to the Publicity Department in the form of the State Film Administration and State Administration of Press and Publication.[33]
Private enterprises[edit]
Media outlets usually employ their own monitors to ensure political content does not cross Party lines.[28] For example, WeChat, a popular messaging and social media platform run by Tencent, uses semi-automated methods to monitor content sent between accounts, including images, checking for politically sensitive material, and will block said material from reaching the intended recipient, even if the sending account is non-Chinese.[34] Other companies may contract censorship out to independent firms.[35]
Sina Weibo, the dominant microblogging platform in China, has an internal censorship department that issues its own directives in line with government authority requirements and employs its own censors to monitor content. The Committee to Protect Journalists has published documents it said are from the Weibo censorship department between 2011 and 2014 that detailed the methodology: "... Sina's computer system scans each post using an algorithm designed to identify politically unacceptable content... [p]osts are flagged by the algorithm and forwarded to the department's employees, who decide their fate based on the instructions listed in the censorship logs."[36] This method is consistent with those documented by King, Pan & Roberts (2014) for other websites.[37] Weibo has been reprimanded and forced to limit certain website functions by Chinese authorities as a consequence for failure to adequately censor content.[38]
Responses from society[edit]
Self-censorship[edit]
Various individuals and organizations both in and outside of China sometimes voluntarily self-censor information that they share publicly by avoiding topics that are believed to be politically sensitive or controversial. These individuals and organizations often self-censor to avoid inviting unwanted attention or repercussions from the Chinese government. For example, in 2017 journalism professor Luwei Rose Luqiu conducted several anonymous interviews with well-known political satirists residing in China to demonstrate how censorship has increased since the creation of the State Internet Information Office in 2011.[223] Interviewees described how, since 2011, they became increasingly cautious of the content they posted online and on social media in fear of repercussions from authorities.[224] Most of the interviewees personally experienced being contacted by the National Security Police to "drink tea" (unofficial and casual conversation in plain clothes and in public), or be summoned, detained, and possibly disappeared.[224] Luqiu argues that the changing policies of the Chinese government about what is considered unacceptable to share and discuss on the internet has made the practice of self-censorship more necessary for individuals such as political satirists who want to avoid such consequences as being banned from online platforms or being contacted by the police.[225] These perspectives on self-censorship by the interviewees are a part of internet censorship in China, which the Chinese government describes as regulations meant to prevent "subversion of state power," "undermining of national unity," and infringing upon national honor and interests.[3]
