Islamic State – Khorasan Province
The Islamic State – Khorasan Province[a] (ISIS–K, IS–K, IS–KP) is a regional branch of the Salafi jihadist group Islamic State (IS) active in South-Central Asia, primarily Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISIS–K seeks to destabilize and replace current governments within historic Khorasan region with the goal of establishing a caliphate across South and Central Asia, governed under a strict interpretation of Islamic sharia law, which they plan to expand beyond the region.[17]
Not to be confused with Khorasan province, Greater Khorasan, or the Khorasan group.Islamic State – Khorasan Province
Wali:
- Hafiz Saeed Khan † (2015 – Jul 2016)
- Abdul Haseeb Logari † (2016 – Apr 2017)
- Abdul Rahman Ghaleb † (Apr–Jul 2017)
- Abu Saad Erhabi † (Jul 2017 – Aug 2018)
- Abu Omar al-Khorasani
(Aug 2018 – Apr 2019) - Mawlawi Aslam Farooqi (Apr 2019 – Apr 2020)
- Shahab al-Muhajir (Apr 2020 – present)
Known leader:
- Sultan Aziz Azam[1]
- Maulawi Rajab[1]
- Maulawi Habib ur Rahman
- Dawood Ahmad Sofi
- Ishfaq Ahmed Sofi
- Mohamed Zahran
- Mufti Nemat
- Qari Hekmat †
26 January 2015[2]
2015–present
Achin District, Afghanistan (de facto, originally)
1000-2000 (UN estimate) [3]
Subgroups
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (since 2015)- Jundallah (2014–2017)
Groups
Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (claimed by Tajik government; denied)- Tehreek-e-Khilafat (Pakistan)[5]
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (Aug 2014 – Mar 2015)- National Thowheeth Jama'ath (2016 – May 2019)
- Gansu Hui Group (China)[6]
Non-state opponents
State opponents
ISIS–K is responsible for numerous of attacks targeting civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan, predominately against Shia Muslims, politicians, and government employees. In August 2017, ISIS–K and the Taliban jointly attacked several villages inhabited by the Shia Hazara minority in northern Afghanistan, resulting in the mass murder of Hazara men, women, and children within Sar-e Pol Province.[18][19][20][21] Some of its most notable attacks include the 2021 Kabul airport attack that killed 13 American military personnel and at least 169 Afghans in Kabul during the U.S. withdrawal from the country, twin suicide bombings in July 2018 that killed at least 131 at election rallies in Pakistan, twin bombings in July 2016 that killed 97 Shia Hazara protestors in downtown Kabul, and a suicide bombing in July 2023 that killed 63 in Khar, Pakistan of a JUI (F) rally.
While the majority of ISIS–K attacks occur in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, since April 2022, ISIS–K has expanded to conduct external operations beyond its traditional area of operations. In April and May 2022, respectively, ISIS–K launched rockets from Afghan territory into the country's northern neighbors of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In January 2024, two ISIS–K attackers carried out twin suicide bombings in Kerman, Iran, during a procession mourning the US assassination of Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani, killing 94.[22][23] In March 2024, four Tajik ISIS–K gunmen launched an attack on a concert hall in Krasnogorsk, Russia, with rifles and incendiaries, killing 144 and marking the group's first attack beyond Afghanistan's neighbors.[24][25] In June 2024, US officials arrested 8 Tajik men in Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia, who were reportedly involved in an ISIS–K plot within the United States, with connections to a larger ISIS–K cell being monitored in Central Europe.[26][27] All eight were said to have entered the United States illegally across the U.S. border with Mexico.[27]
ISIS–K began with the dispatch of Afghan and Pakistani militants from al-Qaeda-aligned groups to the Syrian civil war, who returned to the region with instructions and funding to recruit fighters for a branch of the Islamic State in the Khorasan region. The group's traditional base of power began and remains in eastern Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan, recruiting from former dissatisfied fighters and dissenters of the Taliban[28] as well as individuals from South and South East Asia.[29][30]
Analysis[edit]
Taliban - ISIS-K relations[edit]
Since the Taliban took control of the Afghan central government following the United States withdrawal and collapse of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in August 2021, the Taliban has been locked in a violent counterinsurgency struggle against ISIS–K.[93] The Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has sought international legitimacy by demonstrating its efforts to curb terrorism and secure national sovereignty over Afghan territory, namely for prospects of international investment to reverse Afghanistan's increasing poverty.[94][95]
ISIS–K, seeking to establish the Khorasan Province of a greater Islamic State on Afghan territory, principally seeks to undermine the so-called 'apostate' and 'Western puppet' Taliban regime in hopes of once again regaining control of Afghan territory.[96][97]
Beginning in late 2022 and continuing through 2023, ISIS–K has launched attacks on diplomats from the People's Republic of China[98][99] and Islamic Republic of Pakistan,[98] nations with warmer relations towards the Taliban,[100] aiming to deter foreign recognition, investment, or support to the Taliban government through violent attacks exhibiting Taliban failures to provide security.[94]
Today, ISIS–K is engaged in a protracted, low-intensity conflict with the Taliban government. Though the Taliban and ISIS–K actively fought against the United States, ISIS-K has long maintained a greater operational focus on attacking Taliban targets. The Taliban, on the other hand, have made efforts of debated effectiveness to target ISIS–K militants through violent raids, protect foreign diplomats and investors from ISIS–K attacks, and publicly downplay the presence of ISIS in the country to attract foreign recognition and investment, as well as to demonstrate compliance with the Doha Accord.
Despite the continued opposition between ISIS–K and the Taliban, there exist infrequent cases of the two groups' cooperation during the NATO war in Afghanistan, primarily in the form of attacks on the minority Shia Hazara. In August 2017, the Taliban and ISIS–K jointly launched a major attack against some Hazara minority villages in northern Afghanistan and brutally slaughtered dozens of Hazara men, women and children in Sar-e Pol Province.[18][19][20]
The National Security Department of the former Afghan government has also stated many times that the Haqqani network and the Taliban, supports ISKP fighters.[101][21]
Membership[edit]
According to a UN report, up to 70 IS fighters arrived from Iraq and Syria to form the initial core of the group in Afghanistan.[102] Most of the group's membership growth has come from recruiting Afghan defectors from the Taliban.[103] In Afghanistan, IS has not only been recruiting from the villages but also the urban middle class and specifically targeting the universities, as lecturers in Islamic law as well as students at Kabul University have pledged allegiance to the group.[104]
Foreign fighters from Pakistan and Uzbekistan are also known to be part of the group.[103] Other foreign fighters have included Indians, with 14 Keralites having been freed by the Taliban from prison following the fall of Kabul.[105] The Taliban also claimed that two Malaysians of ISIS–K were caught by them following a gun battle in Kabul on August 26, 2021.[29] Individuals from Myanmar and Bangladesh[30] have also been part of it, and one known Bangladeshi national of ISIS–K was arrested by the Afghan intelligence in 2020.[106]
After the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban in 2021, several members of Afghan intelligence agency and Afghan National Army have also joined the Islamic State – Khorasan Province.[107][108]
Gulmurod Salimovich Khalimov lieutenant-colonel and commander of the police special forces of the Interior Ministry of Tajikistan until 2015 defected to Islamic state Syria and later joined ISIS-K and became a commander within the group.[109]
the promotion of Islamic extremism through religious schools, while assisting the Taliban in gaining and maintaining power, can also facilitate the recruitment of other Islamic extremist groups, such as ISIS-K[110]
On two occasions,terrorists that wearing suicide vests were arrested by the former government’s national security forces from Salafi schools in the Yengi Qala district of Takhar Province.In particular, Salafi schools operating under the Taliban regime are already aligned with ISIS-K.The complete regulation of religious schools is arduous because the Taliban group itself actively supports their activities and is among the foremost promoters of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan.These schools are numerous, especially in the northeastern provinces of Afghanistan, with an estimated three to four Salafi schools in each district[111]
Media[edit]
ISIS–K is a prolific producer of propaganda, outdone only by the Islamic State's core in Iraq and Syria. ISIS–K publishes and circulates a variety of materials through the al-Azaim Media Foundation (Arabic: مؤسسة العزائم, romanized: Muasasat al-A'zayim) for Media Production, whose status as an official element of ISIS–K experts disagree on as the group has yet to claim or disclaim them. Notably, the al-Azaim Foundation has been known to issue claims of attacks before al-Amaq News Agency, the Islamic State's foremost source for claims of attacks by any Islamic State affiliate. Al-Azaim, which publishes nearly all ISIS–K propaganda, appeared publicly in August 2021 as the US withdrew its forces and the Taliban took power in Kabul.[130] Prior to the Taliban takeover, ISIS–K propaganda was produced and distributed by multiple organizations including Khalid Media (responsible for video statements) and Black Flags (audio and text statements), until their 2021 consolidation into al-Azaim. Content for al-Azaim is often written and submitted by sympathizers and supporters in the region, about 70% of which is originally published in Pashto, however many supporters provide translation services of al-Azaim's content and that of the Islamic State's publications into Pashto, Dari, Urdu, Tajik, Bengali, Hindi, Russian, and sometimes Arabic, Tamil, Malayalam, and Uyghur. Al-Azaim primarily disseminates its content through Telegram, X (formerly Twitter), Rocket.chat, and others. In 2022, amidst raids by the Taliban General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) against ISIS–K targets, GDI had infiltrated a number of ISIS–K channels which had temporarily disrupted content distribution.[131][132][133]
Beyond books, monographs, videos, and letters, al-Azaim Foundation is best known for its production of regular newsletters and magazines, most famous of which are Khorasan Ghag (lit. 'Voice of Khorasan') magazine in Pashto, the Voice of Khurasan magazine in English, and Yalghar (lit. 'Attack') in Urdu. Although addressing modern events in newsletters and magazines, discrediting the Taliban as religious leaders, political leaders, and guarantors of security occupy the bulk of ISIS–K propaganda.[132]