Radicalization

Radicalization that occurs across multiple reinforcing pathways greatly increases a group's resilience and lethality. Furthermore, by compromising a group's ability to blend in with non-radical society and to participate in a modern, national or international economy, radicalization serves as a kind of sociological trap that gives individuals no other place to go to satisfy their material and spiritual needs.^[6]

Mutual aid[edit]

Eli Berman's 2009 book Radical, Religious, and Violent: the New Economics of Terrorism^[47] applies a rational choice model to the process of radicalization, demonstrating that the presence of mutual aid networks increase the resilience of radical groups. When those groups decide to use violence, they also enjoy a heightened level of lethality and are protected from defection and other forms of intervention by states and outside groups.


All organizations insofar as they include the possibility of free riders by extension experience defection constraints. Within the context of a violent extremist organization, defection means either defection to a counterintelligence or security apparatus, or defection to a non-radical criminal apparatus. Both of these outcomes spoil specific plans to exercise violence in the name of the group at large. The "defection constraint" is similar to a threshold price-point in that it denotes what rewards would justify the defection of any one individual within the context of an organization. Berman uses the example of a Taliban protection racket for convoys of consumer goods moving through Afghanistan: checkpoints are set up at several points along a trade route, and each checkpoint's team is given a small percentage of the convoy's total value if it arrives safely at its destination. The incentive for any one checkpoint's team deciding to simply hijack a convoy as it passes through, sell the goods off, and escape, increases as the value of the convoy increases. The same dynamic applies to attacks; while an individual in a terrorist group may not feel drawn by the reward of alerting the police to an impending low level crime, the reward for alerting the police to an impending high-profile attack, such as a mass bombing, becomes more attractive. While non-radicalized and criminal organizations can only rely on organizational cohesion through a calculus of greed, fear, and perhaps familial loyalty, Berman argues that religious radicalization greatly increases the defection constraints of radical terrorist organizations by requiring outsized demonstrations of commitment to the cause prior to recruiting operatives.


Mutual aid is the voluntary and reciprocal exchange of goods within an organization. Examples in various religious antecedents include Judaic Tzedakah, Islamic Zakat, and various Christian institutions of charity, as described in the Acts of the Apostles. Berman argues that religious organizations experience economic risks by extending mutual aid to all alleged believers—theological assent is cheap, action can be costly. By imposing a series of outwardly visible social rules, such as restrictions (or prescriptions) on dress, diet, language, and social interactions, groups impose a cost on entering into a mutual aid partnership, diminishing the occurrence of free riding.


These restrictions have a dual effect in radical groups. Not only do they ensure that an individual is committed to the cause, but they also diminish individual's access to consumption opportunities and social interaction that might persuade them to distance themselves from the cause. As individuals become more involved with radical activities, their social circles become more constrained, which diminishes contact with non-radicalized persons and further entrenches radicalized thinking. For example, when a young man spends several years in a Yeshiva in order to establish himself within a Haredi community, he foregoes future earnings that would be accessible should he choose a secular education. To quote Berman "As consumption opportunities are limited, work for pay becomes less appealing, freeing up even more time for community activities." This sunk cost figures into future calculations, and raises the defection constraint in a way that non-radicalized group dynamics cannot. Going back to the Taliban convoy example, not only have the two footsoldiers in question have been vetted by demonstrating commitment to the cause, they also have had their exterior options limited such that it would be difficult to blend into a new environment for lack of skills and cultural understanding. As such, the threshold price point to defect, as represented by the value of the convoy, increases to include both the price of losing their existing support network and non-quantifiable factors such as friends, family, safety, and other goods over the course of their lives.