Salafi jihadism
Salafi jihadism, also known as revolutionary Salafism[1] or jihadist Salafism, is a religious-political Sunni Islamist ideology that seeks to establish a global caliphate, characterized by the advocacy of "physical" (military) jihadist attacks on non-Muslim targets. The Salafist interpretation of sacred Islamic texts is "in their most literal, traditional sense",[2] which adherents claim will bring about the return to "true Islam".[3][4][5][6][7]
The original use of the term "jihadist Salafists" (also "Salafi-jihadi" or "Salafist jihadis")[3][4][5][8] came from French political scientist Gilles Kepel[9][10][11][12] to refer to international volunteers of the jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan who had come from around the world to fight for Islam against Marxist forces in Afghanistan and had lost the American-Saudi funding and interest after the Soviet forces had withdrawn, but wanted to continue waging jihad elsewhere.[13] Their original jihad was against an aggressive anti-religious power (Soviet Union and its Marxist allies), attempting to take over a Muslim region (Afghanistan), and had been enthusiastically supported by large numbers of Muslims including governments. However, isolated from their national and social class origins and seeking to "rationalize" their "existence and behavior",[9] some Arab Afghan volunteers expanded the targets of their jihad to include the United States (whom they "perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith", despite having supported and armed the Afghan Mujahideen), and various governments of Muslim-majority countries - whom they perceived as apostates from Islam.[2]
Jihadist and Salafist elements of "hybrid" ideology developed by international volunteers ("Arab-Afghan" Mujahideen) had not been joined previously because mainstream Salafis,[3][8][14] (dubbed by some Western commentators as "good Salafis"),[11] had mostly adhered to political quietism - eschewing political activities and partisan allegiances, viewing them as potentially divisive for the broader Muslim community and as a distraction from the studying and practicing of Islam.[15] Prominent Quietist Salafi scholars have denounced doctrines of Salafi jihadism as Bid'ah ("innovation") and "heretical",[16] strongly forbidding Muslims from participating or assisting in any armed underground activity against ruling governments.[Note 1][a] Jihadist salafists often dismiss the quietist scholars as "'sheikist" traitors, portraying them as palace scholars worried about the patronage of "the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula" rather than pure Islam,[2] and contend that they are not dividing the Muslim community because, (in their view), the rulers of Muslim-majority countries and other self-proclaimed Muslims they attack are not actually part of the community having deviated from Islam and become apostates or false Muslims.[3][5][19]
Early ideologues of the movement were Arab Afghan veterans of the Afghan jihad: Abu Qatada al-Filistini, the (naturalized Spanish) Syrian Abu Musab, Mustapha Kamel known as Abu Hamza al-Masri, etc.[2] The jihadist ideology of Qutbism has been identified variously as the ideological foundation of the movement,[3][20][21] a closely related Islamist ideology,[3][22][23][24] or a variety of revolutionary Salafism.[3][23] While Salafism had little presence in Europe during the 1980s, Salafi jihadists had by the mid-2000s acquired "a burgeoning presence in Europe, having attempted more than 30 terrorist attacks among E.U. countries since 2001."[11] While many see the influence and activities of Salafi jihadists as in decline after 2000 (at least in the United States),[25][26] others see the movement as growing in the wake of the Arab Spring, the breakdown of state control in Libya and Syria in 2014,[27] and the U.S. retreat from Afghanistan in 2021.[28]
According to political scientist Gilles Kepel, Salafist jihadism combined "respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, ... with an absolute commitment to jihad, whose number-one target had to be America, perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith."[33] 13th century Hanbalite jurist Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1328 C.E/ 728 A.H), a maverick cleric known for his fierce anti-Mongol stances, is the most authoritative classical theologian in Salafi-jihadist discourse.[34]
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, contemporary jihadi Salafism is characterized by "five features":
Another researcher, Thomas Hegghammer, has outlined five objectives shared by jihadis:[35]
Robin Wright notes the importance in Salafi jihadist groups of
Al Jazeera journalist Jamal Al Sharif describes Salafi jihadism as combining "the doctrinal content and approach of Salafism and organisational models from Muslim Brotherhood organisations. Their motto emerged as 'Salafism in doctrine, modernity in confrontation'".[37]
Differences from Quietist and Islamist Salafism[edit]
Much of Salafi-Jihadist discourse borrows heavily from Sayyid Qutb's concept of jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance), hakimiyya (Sovereignty of God) and takfir (excommunication). Prominent contemporary ideologues of Salafi jihadism, such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada al Filistini, drew heavily from the works of Sayyid Qutb and adopted concepts of Al-Wala wal Bara from his writings. Maqdisi’s interpretation of Al-Wala wal Bara marked a distinct shift from traditional Salafi theology by introducing Takfiri principles to it. Adopting a binary world-view, Maqdisi excommunicated contemporary governments in the Muslim World and their collaborators as apostates. Salafi Jihadists also reject democracy as it contradicts their interpretation of Hakimiyya. Salafi Islamists, while supporting revolutions to topple authoritarian regimes, permit the participation in democratic systems across the world to Islamize the political order through the existing structures. These revolutionary Islamist doctrines advocating violent overthrow of the existing political order, is seen as heretical by Quietist Salafis. [38]
Salafi jihadists distinguish themselves from Quietist salafis whom they label "sheikist", so named because – the jihadists believe – that the "sheikists" had forsaken adoration of God for adoration of "the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula, with the Al Saud family at their head". Principal among the sheikist scholars was Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz – "the archetypal court ulema [ulama al-balat]". These allegedly "false" salafi "had to be striven against and eliminated", but even more infuriating was the Salafi Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood, whom the Salafi jihadists considered excessively moderate and lacking in a stricter literalist interpretation of holy texts.[33]
Quietist Salafi scholarship in turn, denounce Salafi jihadism as a heterodox ideology far-removed from Salafi orthodoxy.[16] Quietist Salafi scholars such as Albani, Ibn Uthaymeen, Ibn Baz, Saleh Al-Fawzan, and Muqbil ibn Hadi condemned rebellion against the rulers as "the most corrupt of innovations", and forbade Muslims "to take it upon himself to execute a ruling" which is under the jurisdiction of the rulers.[39][40][41][42][43][Note 2] Salafi jihadists contend that they are not dividing the Muslim community because, in their view, the rulers of Muslim-majority countries and other self-proclaimed Muslims they attack have deviated from Islam and are actually apostates or false Muslims.[3][5][19]
Quietist Salafis criticize Al-Qaeda and Islamic State as Qutbists and often label Salafi Islamists as "Surooris". According to them, these organizations are directly opposed to Salafiyya and its manhaj (methodology). Major doctrines of the Salafi Jihadist movement have its roots in early heterodox sects such as the Kharijites. As a result, heavy creedal disparities exist between traditional Salafis and Salafi Jihadists. Mainstream Salafism, which consists of both quietist and political Salafis, reject the violence of Jihadists. Major Purist Salafi ulema condemn certain Salafi-jihadist organisations as Kharijites.[38]