Uganda–Tanzania War
The Uganda–Tanzania War, known in Tanzania as the Kagera War (Kiswahili: Vita vya Kagera) and in Uganda as the 1979 Liberation War,[a] was fought between Uganda and Tanzania from October 1978 until June 1979 and led to the overthrow of Ugandan President Idi Amin. The war was preceded by a deterioration of relations between Uganda and Tanzania following Amin's 1971 overthrow of President Milton Obote, who was close to the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. Over the following years, Amin's regime was destabilised by violent purges, economic problems, and dissatisfaction in the Uganda Army.
The circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the war are not clear, and differing accounts of the events exist. In October 1978, Ugandan forces began making incursions into Tanzania. Later that month, the Uganda Army launched an invasion, looting property and killing civilians. Ugandan official media declared the annexation of the Kagera Salient. On 2 November, Nyerere declared war on Uganda and mobilised the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) to retake the salient. Nyerere also mobilised Ugandan rebels loyal to Obote and Yoweri Museveni to weaken Amin's regime. After Amin failed to renounce his claims to Kagera and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) failed to condemn the Ugandan invasion, the TPDF occupied the towns of Masaka and Mbarara in southern Uganda.
While the TPDF prepared to clear the way to Kampala, the Ugandan capital, Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of Libya and an ally of Amin, dispatched several thousand troops to Uganda to assist the Uganda Army. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation also sent a number of guerrillas to aid Amin. In March the largest battle of the war occurred when the Tanzanians and Ugandan rebels defeated a combined Ugandan-Libyan-Palestinian force at Lukaya. The loss of Lukaya led the Uganda Army to begin to collapse. Nyerere believed that Ugandan rebels should be given time to organise their own government to succeed Amin. He sponsored a conference of rebels and exiles in Moshi later that month, where the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) was founded. Libya ended its intervention in early April and its troops left the country. On 10 April a combined TPDF-UNLF force attacked Kampala, and secured it the following day. Amin fled into exile while a UNLF government was established. In the following months, the TPDF occupied Uganda, facing only scattered resistance. It secured the Uganda–Sudan border in June, bringing the war to an end.
The war severely harmed Tanzania's fragile economy and inflicted long-lasting damage to Kagera. It also had severe economic consequences in Uganda, and brought about a wave of crime and political violence as the UNLF government struggled to maintain order. Political disagreements and the persistence of the remnants of the Uganda Army in the border regions ultimately led to the outbreak of the Ugandan Bush War in 1980.
Aftermath[edit]
Analyses[edit]
Sociologist Ronald Aminzade asserted that "the key" to Tanzania's victory was its ideological framing of the war as a threat to the nation, thus facilitating the mobilisation of a popular militia that performed well in combat. Aminzade stated that in contrast Uganda "embarked on a nonideological territorial war", deploying forces that suffered from low morale and internal dissension.[230] Journalist Godwin Matatu reasoned that the Uganda Army's failures rested on its low morale and reliance on vehicles and roads which made them vulnerable to Tanzanian ground forces, who travelled on foot for much of the war.[231] Journalist Anne Abaho concluded that Uganda lost the war due to four key factors: internal tensions and incompetence in the Uganda Army, the Tanzanian deployment of BM-21 Grad rocket launchers and the failure of Uganda to counter them, a lack of military intelligence, and poor coordination with Libya.[88] Venter instead claimed that the TPDF had "the edge" due to an effective sabotage campaign waged by the Save Uganda Movement as well as the "lackluster ability of Amin's main counter-strike force".[232]
War correspondents described the military tactics employed by both sides during the war as mostly unimaginative, with Matt Franjola claiming that it was "almost as if all the officers had carefully studied a 1930 British Infantryman's Handbook. Much of it was so predictable".[233] Some Western military analysts attributed Tanzania's victory to the collapse of the Uganda Army, arguing that the TPDF would have been defeated by most other African armies.[234] Others felt that the TPDF's success indicated substantial improvements in African military capabilities over the previous years.[235] Military analyst William Thom praised the TPDF's ability to successfully deploy its forces over considerable distances.[236] Venter opinioned that even though the TPDF soldiers proved to be "thorough looters", they were "fighters [of] better caliber" than the contemporary Nigerians, Ethiopians, Angolans, and Mozambicans. He credited their successful ambush operations to training by Cubans and East Germans.[233] Intelligence analyst Kenneth M. Pollack attributed Libyan troops' failures to their low morale and lack of military intelligence.[237] Academic Benoni Turyahikayo-Rugyema wrote in 1998 that "Had Amin not invaded the Kagera Salient in Tanzania he probably would still be ruling Uganda."[238]
Several academics have evaluated whether the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda and its effort to depose Amin could be classified as an instance of justified humanitarian intervention. While some writers agree that Tanzania's action was humanitarian in nature, others have disputed such a conclusion, arguing that even if Tanzania fought the war with some humanitarian considerations, it was largely invading Uganda for different reasons.[239] For its own part, the Tanzanian government accused Amin of committing atrocities against his people and stressed that many Ugandans "celebrated" Tanzania's invasion, but it did not justify the war on humanitarian grounds. Instead, it argued that the country had acted in self-defence of its territory and that Amin's regime posed "a turbulent menace to the peace and security of East Africa".[240] Christianity specialist Emmanuel K. Twesigye considered the war "a good example of the 'just war theory' at work".[241] Political scientist Daniel G. Acheson-Brown concluded that, according to just war theory as espoused by Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars, Tanzania's invasion of Uganda was justified on humanitarian grounds to overthrow a brutal dictatorship. Acheson-Brown also noted that the Uganda Army committed "an overwhelming number of atrocities" during the conflict and that Tanzania made "some significant violations of the proper conduct of war", particularly when the TPDF destroyed Mutukula.[242] Walzer also considered the war a case of justified intervention.[243] Legal scholar Noreen Burrows wrote that while Tanzania's attack on Uganda violated strictly construed international law, it was justified by moral and political arguments.[242] International law scholar Sean D. Murphy characterised Tanzania's invasion of Uganda as "one of mixed reasons of self-defense and protection of human rights".[244] Belgium later cited the Uganda–Tanzania War as an example of justified intervention when explaining its decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's intervention in the Kosovo War.[245]
International political controversy[edit]
The overthrow of a sovereign head of state by a foreign military had never occurred in post-colonial Africa and had been strongly discouraged by the OAU.[188] At an OAU conference in July 1979, President Gaafar Nimeiry of Sudan said that the Uganda–Tanzania War had set a "serious precedent" and noted that the organisation's charter "prohibits interference in other people's internal affairs and invasion of their territory by armed force."[246] Nigerian Head of State Olusegun Obasanjo shared similar concerns. Some observers dissented from this line of thought and argued that the situation demonstrated that the OAU charter needed reform. Nyerere accused the OAU of shielding black African leaders from criticism, noting that Amin's regime had killed more people than the white minority governments in southern Africa.[247] He also circulated a "Blue Book" published by the Tanzanian government, which argued that Tanzania's role in the war was justified by Uganda's attack on the Kagera Salient and Libya's armed intervention, which would have prevented the Ugandan rebels from overthrowing Amin themselves.[240] President Godfrey Binaisa, Lule's successor, praised the Tanzanian intervention.[247] Most Western states cautiously avoided commenting on Tanzania's role in deposing Amin, though British Foreign Secretary David Owen declared that he was pleased with the end of Amin's rule.[248] According to academics Roy May and Oliver Furley, the overthrow of the regime was "tacitly" accepted by the international community, as indicated by the speed with which they recognised the UNLF government that replaced it.[188]
Legacy[edit]
Commemoration[edit]
The 435 Tanzanian soldiers who died during the war were buried at the Kaboya Military Cemetery in Muleba District, Kagera Region. A white monument was erected in the cemetery and adorned with the names of the dead.[292] Nyerere, Tanzanian Vice President Aboud Jumbe, Prime Minister Sokoine, Chief of Defence Forces Abdallah Twalipo, and Chama Cha Mapinduzi Executive Secretary Pius Msekwa visited the monument on 26 July 1979 to pay their respects to the dead soldiers.[293] Another monument was built in Arusha, displaying a statue of a soldier celebrating victory.[294] Nyerere toured Tabora, Arusha, Mtwara, Bukoba, Mwanza, Tanga, Zanzibar, Iringa, Dodoma, Dar es Salaam, and Mara to thank the Tanzanian population for its contributions to the war effort.[295] On 1 September 1979 a series of national ceremonies were held to honour public contribution to the war effort.[296] On 25 July 2014 Tanzania observed the 36th anniversary of the war and recognised the soldiers and civilians that died in the conflict.[297]
After the war and until 1986, when Museveni took power, 11 April was celebrated as "Liberation Day" in Uganda.[298] In 2002 Uganda renewed its official celebration of Amin's overthrow.[299] In the 2000s the Ugandan Government established the Kagera Medal to be awarded to Ugandan rebels or foreigners who fought against Amin's regime between 1971 and 1979.[300]
Historiography and documentation[edit]
Historians have paid little attention to the war[301] and few books have been written about it.[302][303][304] Tanzanian journalist Baldwin Mzirai published Kuzama kwa Idi Amin in 1980, which details the Tanzanian military operations of the conflict.[305] American journalists Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey published War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin in 1983. They followed Tanzanian forces into Uganda and witnessed the battles for Entebbe and Kampala. The 11-chapter work, in addition to covering the conflict, discusses some of its political implications in Uganda.[302] Henry R. Muhanika published an Utenzi poetic account of the war in 1981, Utenzi wa vita vya Kagera na anguko la Idi Amin Dada.[306] In 1980 the state-owned Tanzania Film Company and the Audio Visual Institute released a colour documentary chronicling the conflict, entitled, Vita vya Kagera. It emphasised the "bravery and determination" of the Tanzanian forces.[307] The war is known in Tanzania as the Kagera War and in Uganda as the 1979 Liberation War.[69]