The Wahhabi movement opposed rituals related to the veneration of Muslim saints and pilgrimages to their tombs and shrines, which were widespread amongst the people of Najd. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his followers were highly inspired by the influential Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyyah[d] (1263–1328 C.E/ 661 – 728 A.H) who advocated for a return to the purity of the first three generations (Salaf) to rid Muslims of inauthentic outgrowths (bidʻah), and regarded his works as core scholarly references in theology. While being influenced by Hanbali doctrines, the movement repudiated Taqlid to legal authorities, including oft-cited scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim (d. 1350 C.E/ 751 A.H).[6]
Wahhabism has been variously characterized by historians as "orthodox", "puritan(ical)", or "revolutionary",[e] while its adherents describe it as an Islamic "reform movement" to restore "pure monotheistic worship". The Turkish News paper Daily Sabah argued against a classification of Wahhabism as form of Sunnism entirely due to traditional, historical, practical, and hermeneutic differences.[7] Socio-politically, the movement represented the first major Arab-led revolt against the Turkish, Persian and foreign empires that had dominated the Islamic world since the Mongol invasions and the fall of Abbasid Caliphate in the 13th century; and would later serve as a revolutionary impetus for 19th-century pan-Arab trends.[f] In 1744, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab formed a pact with a local leader, Muhammad bin Saud,[8] establishing a politico-religious alliance with the Saudi monarchy that lasted for more than 250 years. The Wahhabi movement gradually rose to prominence as an influential anti-colonial reform trend in the Islamic world that advocated the re-generation of the social and political prowess of Muslims. Its revolutionary themes inspired several Islamic revivalists, scholars, pan-Islamist ideologues and anti-colonial activists as far as West Africa.[g]
For more than two centuries, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab's teachings were championed as the official creed in the three Saudi States. As of 2017, changes to Saudi religious policy by Crown PrinceMohammed bin Salman have led to widespread crackdown on Islamists in Saudi Arabia and rest of the Arab world. By 2021, the waning power of the religious clerics brought forth by the social, economic, political changes, and Saudi government's promotion of a nationalist narrative that emphasize non-Islamic components led to what has been described as the "post-Wahhabi era" of Saudi Arabia.[h] Saudi Arabia's annual commemoration of its founding day on 22 February since 2022, which marked the establishment of Emirate of Dir'iyah by Muhammad ibn Saud in 1727 and de-emphasized his pact with Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab in 1744, has led to the official "uncoupling" of the religious clergy by the Saudi state.[i]
Islam is the only solution;
A direct return to the Quran and the ;
Sunnah
Implementation of (Islamic law) is the objective;
Sharia
Those who opposed the reform efforts were enemies of God.
Members of the movement, like the early Muslims during the era of the , were trained in piety and military skills. These movements waged their reformist efforts through preaching and Jihad.[72]
Salaf
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) was the founder of the Wahhabi movement.[265]
[264]
(1752–1826) was the head of Wahhabism after his father retired from public life in 1773. After the fall of the first Saudi emirate, Abd Allah went into exile in Cairo where he died.[264]
'Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab
(1780–1818) was a grandson of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and author of an influential treatise that restricted travel to and residing in land of idolaters.[264]
'Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan (1780–1869) was head of the religious estate in the .[264]
second Saudi emirate
'Abd al-Latif ibn 'Abd al-Rahman (1810–1876) Head of religious estate in 1860 and early 1870s.
[264]
(1848–1921) was the head of religious estate during period of Rashidi rule and the early years of King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud.[264]
Abd Allah ibn Abd al-Latif Al ash-Sheikh
(1893–1969) was the head of Wahhabism in mid twentieth century. He has been said to have "dominated the Wahhabi religious estate and enjoyed unrivaled religious authority".[266]
(1910–1999) has been called "the most prominent proponent" of Wahhabism during his time.[269]
'Abd al-Azeez ibn Baz
(1925–2001) is another "giant". According to David Dean Commins, no one "has emerged" with the same "degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment" since their deaths.[269]
Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen
There has traditionally been a recognized head of the Wahhabi "religious estate", often a member of Al ash-Sheikh (a descendant of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab) or related to another religious head. For example, Abd al-Latif was the son of Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan.
The appeal of , which considered the Ottoman Empire to be a foreign occupying power and took a powerful precedent from the Wahhabi rebellion against the Ottomans
Arab nationalism
Wahhabi calls for a return to the pristine Islam of the (righteous predecessors) which rejected much of the classical legal precedents; instead deriving directly from Qur'an, Hadith and the sayings of the Salaf; through Ijtihad. This also appealed to the Islamic reformers who pushed for a revival of ijtihad, and a direct return to the original sources for interpreting the Qur'an and Sunnah, to seek solutions to the present day problems.
especially after its boom during the 1970s energy crisis, allowed Saudi Arabia to successfully promote their interpretations of Islam throughout the Islamic World.[270]
In contemporary discourse, the post-Soviet states widely employ the term "Wahhabism" to denote any manifestation of Islamic assertion in neighbouring Muslim countries.[37] During the Soviet-era, the Muslim dissidents were usually labelled with terms such as "Sufi" and "fanatic" employing Islamophobic discourses that aroused hysteria of an underground religious activists threatening the stability of the Marxist order. By the late 1990s, the "Wahhabi" label would become the most common term to refer to the alleged "Islamic menace" in state propaganda, while "Sufism" was invoked as a "moderate" force that balanced the "radicalism" of those who were being accused as "Wahhabis". The old-guard of the post-Soviet states found the label useful to depict all opposition as extremists, thereby bolstering their 'strongman' credentials. In short, any Muslim critical of the religious or political status quo, came at risk of being labelled "Wahhabi".[294]
According to M. Reza Pirbhai, Associate Professor of History at Georgetown University, notions of a "Wahhabi conspiracy" against the West have in recent times resurfaced in various sections of the Western media; employing the term as a catch-all phrase to frame an official narrative that erases the concerns of broad and disparate disenchanted groups pursuing redress for local discontentment caused by neo-colonialism. The earliest mention of "Wahhabism" in The New York Times had appeared in a 1931 editorial which described it as a "traditional" movement; without associating it with "militant" or "anti-Western" trends. Between 1931 and 2007, The New York Times published eighty-six articles that mentioned the word "Wahhabism", out of which six articles had appeared before September 2001, while the rest were published since. During the 1990s, it began to be described as "militant", but not yet as a hostile force. By the 2000s, the 19th century terminology of "Wahhabism" had resurfaced, reprising its role as the " 'fanatical' and 'despotic' antithesis of a civilized world. Reza Pirbhai asserts that this use is deployed to manufacture an official narrative that assists imperial purposes by depicting a coherent and coordinated international network of ideological revolutionaries.[295] Common neo-liberal depictions of Wahhabism define it as a collection of restrictive dogmas, particularly for women, while neo-conservative depictions portray "Wahhabis" as "savages" or "fanatics".[296]
