2016 Turkish coup attempt
On 15 July 2016, a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces, organized as the Peace at Home Council,[33] attempted a coup d'état against state institutions, including the government and president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[34] They attempted to seize control of several places in Ankara, Istanbul, Marmaris and elsewhere, such as the Asian side entrance of the Bosphorus Bridge, but failed to do so after forces and civilians loyal to the state defeated them. The Council cited an erosion of secularism, elimination of democratic rule,[35] disregard for human rights, and Turkey's loss of credibility in the international arena as reasons for the coup.[36][37] The government said it had evidence the coup leaders were linked to the Gülen movement,[35][38][39][40][41] which is designated as a terrorist organization by the Republic of Turkey and led by Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish businessman[42][43][44][45] and a well-known Islamic scholar[46][47][48] who lives in exile in Pennsylvania.[49] The Turkish government alleged that Gülen was behind the coup (which Gülen denied) and that the United States was harboring him.[50][51][52] Events surrounding the coup attempt and the purges in its aftermath reflect a complex power struggle between Islamist elites in Turkey.[53][54]
During the coup attempt, over 300 people were killed,[35] and more than 2,100 were injured. Many government buildings, including the Turkish Parliament and the Presidential Palace, were bombed from the air. Mass arrests followed, with at least 40,000 detained,[35][55] including at least 10,000 soldiers and 2,745 judges, for being affiliated with the coup attempt.[56][57] 15,000 education staff were also suspended and the licenses of 21,000 teachers working at private institutions were revoked after the government stated they were loyal to Gülen.[58] More than 77,000 people have been arrested and over 160,000 fired from their jobs, on reports of connections to Gülen.[59][60][61]
There were many reactions against the coup attempt, both domestically and internationally. The main opposition parties in Turkey condemned the attempt,[35] while several international leaders—such as those of the United States, NATO, the European Union, and neighboring countries—called for "respect of the democratic institutions in Turkey and its elected officials."[62][63] Many international organizations also opposed the coup. The United Nations Security Council, however, did not denounce the coup after disagreements over the phrasing of a statement.[64] Iran opposed the coup and advised Erdogan to defeat the coup plotters.[65]
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the head of United States Central Command, General Joseph Votel,[66][67][68] was "siding with coup plotters", after Votel criticized the Turkish government for arresting the Pentagon's contacts in Turkey.[69][70][71]
In March 2017, Germany's intelligence chief said Germany was unconvinced by Erdoğan's statement that Fethullah Gülen was behind the failed coup attempt.[72][73] The same month, the British Parliament's Foreign Affairs Select Committee said some Gulenists were involved in the coup d'état attempt but found no hard evidence that Fethullah Gülen masterminded the failed coup and found no evidence to justify the United Kingdom designating the Gülen movement as a "terrorist organization".[74]
Reasons for failure[edit]
One of the primary reasons that the coup failed was chaos among the plotters' ranks. Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MİT) head Hakan Fidan discovered the coup plot, and the plotters were forced to execute the coup five hours ahead of schedule. One of the main organizers, General Semih Terzi, was shot dead by loyalist Sgt. Maj. Ömer Halisdemir at the onset, demoralizing and disrupting command and control of the rebels. These two incidents resulted in the coup being carried out in an uncoordinated manner.[169] The highest ranking staff officers opposed the coup, and publicly ordered all personnel to return to their barracks.[170] Acting outside the military chain of command, the rebels lacked the coordination and resources to achieve their goals. The conscripted soldiers that the rebels mobilized were uninformed of their mission's true purpose and became demoralized. Many surrendered rather than shoot demonstrators.[171] The commander of the First Army in Istanbul, General Ümit Dündar, personally called Erdoğan to warn him of the plot, persuading him to evacuate his hotel ahead of the plotters, and helped to secure Istanbul for Erdoğan to land.[172] The MİT also mobilized its anti-aircraft guns, which the plotters were unaware existed, deterring rebel jets and commando teams.[169]
Equally important to the coup's failure, according to military strategist Edward N. Luttwak, was the inability of the rebels to neutralize Erdoğan and other high ranking government officials, either by killing or detaining them.[173] A unit of special forces was sent via helicopter to kill or capture the president, but missed because he had been evacuated by his security detail just minutes before. Once Erdoğan landed at Atatürk International Airport (which had been recaptured from the rebels by his supporters), It became highly unlikely that the coup attempt would succeed.[174] According to a military source, several rebel F-16s targeted Erdoğan's presidential jet en route to Istanbul, but they did not fire.[175] A senior Turkish counter-terrorism official later stated[176] that the jets did not fire because the fighter jet pilots were told by President Erdoğan's pilot over the radio that the (flight of the) Gulfstream IV[177] was a Turkish Airlines flight.
According to Naunihal Singh, author of Seizing Power, the coup attempt also failed because the plotters failed to secure control of the media and shape the narrative. Successful coups require that the rebels control the mass media.[170] This allows even small rebel contingents to portray themselves as fully in control, and their victory as inevitable. Consequently, they convince the public, along with neutral and even loyalist soldiers, to defect to them or not resist. The rebels failed to properly broadcast their messages effectively across the media that they controlled.[170] They failed to capture Türksat, Turkey's main cable and satellite communications company, and failed to gain control of the country's television and mobile phone networks. This allowed Erdoğan to make his Facetime call, and to speak on television.[169]
Other scholars of civil-military relations, like Drew H. Kinney, have said reports like Luttwak and Singh's miss the point of their own analysis: civil resistance thwarted the coup.[178] Luttwak argues that wayward elements of the Turkish armed forces could not silence Erdoğan. Singh says that the rebels could not project success because they couldn't control the message. Kinney states that neither of these reasons on their own matter, but rather it's their effect—civil disobedience—that is important. We might find that "[Gülen's movement] ... [might] have had nothing to do with the attempted takeover in July, but civilians [nevertheless] definitely played a role in thwarting the coup," writes Kinney. "... [A]n unhappy civilian populace mobilized to face down the military."[178]
Erdoğan wasn't censored (Luttwak's point) and was therefore able to use FaceTime to mobilize resistance, which in turn hindered the conspirators' ability to project success (Singh's point). The result is civilian resistance to soldiers, i.e., people power. The reason Singh, Luttwak, and other scholars of civil-military relations miss this is, according to Kinney, because they "usually do not study extra-military reasons for coup failures/successes," but rather put a premium on "the inner-workings of the [military] operation." In short, they blame the military for its failure rather than acknowledge the power of the masses and their successes.[178]
Pro-state forces sent text messages to every Turkish citizen calling for them to protest against the coup attempt.[174] Throughout the night sela prayers were repeatedly called from mosque minarets across the country to encourage people to resist the coup plotters.[35][174][179][180] While the sela is usually called from minarets to inform the public of a funeral, they are also traditionally performed to notify of a significant event, in this case "to rally people".[181]
The coup plotters initiated their operation hours ahead of the planned time when they understood that their plans had been compromised.[182] Had the coup been launched at its original time, the middle of the night, much of the population would have been asleep. The streets would have been mostly empty.[183]
Reports have emerged, neither confirmed nor denied by Russia or Turkey that the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate intercepted signals on an imminent coup passed on to loyal Turkish operatives. The intercepted plans revealed several helicopters with commandos were on the way to Marmaris's coastal resort, where Erdoğan stayed, capturing or killing him. Pre-warned, Erdoğan left quickly to avoid them.[184][185][186][187]
Third-party reactions[edit]
Domestic[edit]
Among the Turkish opposition parties, the Republican People's Party (CHP) issued a statement expressing their public opposition to the coup, and the Hürriyet Daily News reported that Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli telephoned Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım to express his opposition to the coup.[62] The co-chairs of the opposition Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) issued a statement saying that the party was "under all circumstances and as a matter of principle against all kinds of coup."[63] Amongst the minor parties, left-wing nationalist Patriotic Party's Doğu Perinçek backed democracy, when he held Gülen and the Americans responsible.[325] Kurdish militant separatist organization Kurdistan Workers' Party, which Turkey and its allies label as a terrorist organization, urged their supporters to stay away from the coup and rather defend their people,[326] while the Communist Party called upon the people to overthrow the AKP government which they called an "enemy of humanity".[327]
