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Arab Revolt

The Arab Revolt (Arabic: الثورة العربية al-Thawra al-‘Arabiyya), also known as the Great Arab Revolt (الثورة العربية الكبرى al-Thawra al-‘Arabiyya al-Kubrā), was an armed uprising by the Hashemite-led Arabs of the Hejaz[9] against the Ottoman Empire amidst the Middle Eastern theatre of World War I.

This article is about the anti-Ottoman uprising during World War I. For other Arab uprisings, see Arab Revolt (disambiguation).

On the basis of the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence, exchanged between Henry McMahon of the United Kingdom and Hussein bin Ali of the Kingdom of Hejaz, the rebellion against the ruling Turks was officially initiated at Mecca on 10 June 1916.[a] The primary goal of the Arab rebels was to establish an independent and unified Arab state stretching from Aleppo to Aden, which the British government had promised to recognize.[11]


The Sharifian Army, led by Hussein and the Hashemites with backing from the British military's Egyptian Expeditionary Force, successfully fought and expelled the Ottoman military presence from much of the Hejaz and Transjordan. By 1918, the rebels had captured Damascus and proclaimed the Arab Kingdom of Syria, a short-lived monarchy that was led by Hussein's son Faisal I.


Having covertly signed the Sykes–Picot Agreement with the French Third Republic, the British reneged on their promise to support the Arabs' establishment of a singular Arab state.[12] Instead, the Arab-majority Ottoman territories of the Middle East were broken up into a number of League of Nations mandates, jointly controlled by the British and the French. Amidst the partition of the Ottoman Empire, the defeated Ottomans' mainland in Anatolia came under a joint military occupation by the victorious Allies, though this was gradually broken by the Turkish War of Independence, which established the present-day Republic of Turkey.

Forces[edit]

It is estimated that the Arab forces involved in the revolt numbered around 5,000 soldiers.[16] This number however probably applies to the Arab regulars who fought during the Sinai and Palestine campaign with Edmund Allenby's Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and not the irregular forces under the direction of T. E. Lawrence[17] and Faisal. On a few occasions, particularly during the final campaign into Syria, this number would grow significantly. The Arab Bureau of the British Empire in Cairo believed that the revolt would draw the support of all Arabs throughout the Ottoman Empire and Arab lands.[18][19] Faisal and Sharif Hussein reportedly expected to be joined by 100,000 Arab troops. However, the large desertions predicted British Arab Bureau never materialized as the majority of Arab officers remained loyal to the Ottomans until the end.[18][20] Many Arabs joined the Revolt sporadically, often as a campaign was in progress or only when the fighting entered their home region.[21] During the Battle of Aqaba, for instance, while the initial Arab force numbered only a few hundred, over a thousand more from local tribes joined them for the final assault on Aqaba. Estimates of Faisal's effective forces vary, but through most of 1918 at least, they may have numbered as high as 30,000 men.


The Hashemite Army comprised two distinctive forces: tribal irregulars who waged a guerrilla war against the Ottoman Empire and the Sharifian Army, which was recruited from Ottoman Arab POWs and fought in conventional battles.[22] Hashemite forces were initially poorly equipped, but later were to receive significant supplies of weapons, most notably rifles and machine guns from Britain and France.[23]


In the early days of the revolt, Faisal's forces were largely made up of Bedouins and other nomadic desert tribes, who were only loosely allied, loyal more to their respective tribes than the overall cause.[24] The Bedouin would not fight unless paid in advance with gold coin,[25] and by the end of 1916, the French had spent 1.25 million gold francs in subsidizing the revolt.[24] By September 1918, the British were spending £220,000/month to subsidize the revolt.[24]


Faisal had hoped that he could convince Arab troops serving in the Ottoman Army to mutiny and join his cause, but the Ottoman government sent most of its Arab troops to the Western front-lines of the war, and thus only a handful of deserters actually joined the Arab forces until later in the campaign.[26]


By the beginning of the First World War, Arab conscripts constituted about 30% of the wartime Ottoman military of 3 million, serving in all ranks from the lowest to the highest and forming a crucial component of the Ottoman Army.[19][27] Ottoman troops in the Hejaz numbered 20,000 men by 1917.[26] At the outbreak of the revolt in June 1916, the VII Corps of the Fourth Army was stationed in the Hejaz to be joined by the 58th Infantry Division commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Necib Pasha, the 1st Kuvvie- Mürettebe (Provisional Force) led by General Mehmed Cemal Pasha, which had the responsibility of safeguarding the Hejaz railway and the Hejaz Expeditionary Force (Turkish: Hicaz Kuvve-i Seferiyesi), which was under the command of General Fakhri Pasha.[26] In face of increasing attacks on the Hejaz railway, the 2nd Kuvve i Mürettebe was created by 1917.[26] The Ottoman force included a number of Arab units who stayed loyal to the Sultan-Caliph and fought well against the Allies.[26][b]


The Ottoman troops enjoyed an advantage over the Hashemite troops at first in that they were well supplied with modern German weapons.[26] In addition, the Ottoman forces had the support of both the Ottoman Aviation Squadrons, air squadrons from Germany and the Ottoman Gendarmerie or zaptı.[29] Moreover, the Ottomans relied upon the support of Emir Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Rashid of the Emirate of Jabal Shammar, whose tribesmen dominated what is now northern Saudi Arabia and tied down both the Hashemites and Saʻudi forces with the threat of their raiding attacks.[30]


The great weakness of the Ottoman forces was they were at the end of a long and tenuous supply line in the form of the Hejaz railway, and because of their logistical weaknesses, were often forced to fight on the defensive.[26] Ottoman offensives against the Hashemite forces more often faltered due to supply problems than to the actions of the enemy.[26]


The main contribution of the Arab Revolt to the war was to pin down tens of thousands of Ottoman troops who otherwise might have been used to attack the Suez Canal and conquering Damascus, allowing the British to undertake offensive operations with a lower risk of counter-attack. This was indeed the British justification for supporting the revolt, a textbook example of asymmetric warfare that has been studied time and again by military leaders and historians alike.[31]

Underlying causes[edit]

Hussein[edit]

According to Efraim Karsh of Bar-Ilan University, Sharif Hussein of Mecca was "a man with grandiose ambitions" who had first started to fall out with his masters in Istanbul when the dictatorship, a triumvirate known as the Three Pashas (General Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha, and Cemal Pasha), which represented the radical Turkish nationalist wing of the CUP, seized power in a coup d'état in January 1913 and began to pursue a policy of Turkification, which gradually angered non-Turkish subjects.[92] Hussein started to embrace the language of Arab nationalism only after the Young Turks revolt against the Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid II in July 1908.[93] The fighting force of the revolt was mostly combined from Ottoman defectors and Arabian tribes loyal to the Sharif.[94]

Religious justification[edit]

Though the Sharifian revolt has tended to be regarded as a revolt rooted in a secular Arab nationalist sentiment, the Sharif did not present it in those terms. Rather, he accused the Young Turks of violating the sacred tenets of Islam by pursuing the policy of Turkification and discriminating against its non-Turkish population and called Arab Muslims to sacred rebellion against the Ottoman government.[95] The Turks answered by accusing the rebelling tribes of betraying the Muslim Caliphate during a campaign against imperialist powers attempting to divide and govern Muslim lands.[96] The Turks said the revolting Arabs gained nothing after the revolt; rather, the Middle East was carved up by the British and French.

Ethnic tensions[edit]

While the revolt failed to garner significant support from within the Ottoman Empire's soon-to-be Iraq provinces, it did find huge support from Arab populated Levantine provinces.[94] This early Arab nationalism came about when the majority of the Arabs living in the Ottoman Empire were loyal primarily to their own families, clans, and tribes[97] despite efforts of the Turkish ruling class, who pursued a policy of Turkification through the Tanzimat reforms and hoped to create a feeling of "Ottomanism" among the different ethnicities under the Ottoman domain. Liberal reforms brought about by the Tanzimat also transformed the Ottoman Caliphate into a secular empire, which weakened the Islamic concept of Ummah that tied the different races together.[98] The arrival of Committee of Union and Progress to power and the creation of a one-party state in 1913 which mandated Turkish nationalism as a state ideology worsened the relationship between the Ottoman state and its non-Turkish subjects.[97]

Campaigns of the Arab Revolt

Flag of the Arab Revolt

History of Saudi Arabia

South Arabia during World War I

Cleveland, William L. and Martin Bunton. (2016) A History of the Modern Middle East. 6th ed. Westview Press.

Falls, Cyril (1930) Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence; Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from June 1917 to the End of the War Vol. 2. London: H. M. Stationery Office

Erickson, Edward. Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War. Westport, CT: Greenwood.  978-0-313-31516-9.

ISBN

Khalidi, Rashid (1991). . Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-07435-3.

The Origins of Arab Nationalism

Murphy, David (2008) The Arab Revolt 1916–18 Lawrence sets Arabia Ablaze. Osprey: London.  978-1-84603-339-1.

ISBN

Parnell, Charles L. (August 1979) CDR USN "Lawrence of Arabia's Debt to Seapower" United States Naval Institute Proceedings.

Anderson, Scott (2014). Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Atlantic Books.

(1989). A Peace to End All Peace. Avon Books.

Fromkin, David

Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia. ISBN 978-0-06-171261-6.

Korda, Michael

(1935). Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Doubleday, Doran, and Co.

Lawrence, T. E.

Oschenwald, William. 'Ironic Origins: Arab Nationalism in the Hijaz, 1882–1914' in The Origins of Arab Nationalism (1991), ed. Rashid Khalidi, pp. 189–203. Columbia University Press.

Wilson, Mary C. 'The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism' in The Origins of Arab Nationalism (1991), ed. Rashid Khalidi, pp. 204–24. Columbia University Press.

"Arab Uprising: Did the Arab Uprising of 1916 Contribute Significantly to the Military and Political Developments in the Middle East?" in Dennis Showalter, ed. History in Dispute: World War I Vol 8 (Gale, 2003) online

(on King Hussein's website)

History of the Arab Revolt

at PBS

Arab Revolt

Archived 22 September 2014 at the Wayback Machine Shapell Manuscript Foundation

T.E. Lawrence's Original Letters on Palestine

by Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje

The Revolt in Arabia

, Brendan McAleer, 10 August 2017, Autoweek.

Chariots of war: When T.E. Lawrence and his armored Rolls-Royces ruled the Arabian desert