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Foreign fighters in the Syrian Civil War and War in Iraq

Foreign fighters[1] have fought on all four sides of the Syrian Civil War, as well both sides of the War in Iraq. In addition to Sunni foreign fighters, Shia fighters from several countries have joined pro-government militias in Syria, leftist militants have joined Kurdish forces, and other foreign fighters have joined jihadist organizations[2] and private military contractors recruit globally. Estimates of the total number of foreign Sunnis who have fought for the Syrian rebels over the course of the conflict range from 5,000 to over 10,000, while foreign Shia fighters numbered around 10,000 or less in 2013[3] rising to between 15,000 and 25,000 in 2017.[4]

Throughout 2014, with the rise of Islamic State, the Al-Nusra Front, and other groups, their numbers drastically increased[2] and they partnered with and absorbed Syrian rebel groups, both jihadist and non-jihadist. By 2015, foreign jihadists outnumbered Syrian jihadists and other rebels in casualty rolls (16,212 anti-government foreign jihadists were killed in 2015 compared to 7,798 Syrian anti-government rebels killed that same year), a trend that carried over into 2016 (13,297 foreign jihadists and 8,170 Syrian rebels), and 2017 (7,494 foreign jihadists and 6,452 Syrian rebels). However, although the numbers of casualties remained high in this phase, arrivals slowed: according to the United States military, foreign fighters coming to Syria and Iraq in 2013-2015 averaged 2,000 fighters per month, but by 2016, this figure had dropped to less than 500 fighters per month and decreasing.[5] By 2018, the proportion of foreign fighters had far decreased (following heavy losses in the bloody battles of 2015-2017 and various interventions by foreign military forces), and Syrian rebels were once again the majority of anti-government casualties (2,746 foreign jihadists killed compared to 5,852 Syrian rebels).[6][7][8][9]


According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, at least 65,726 anti-government foreign fighters (almost entirely jihadists) were killed in Syria up to May 2020, constituting nearly half of the 138,202 anti-government fighters killed by that point. Additionally, 10,045 foreign fighters on the side of the Syrian government were killed by then (1,700 Lebanese Hezbollah and 8,345 others, including 2,000+ militiamen of Liwa Fatemiyoun) and 264 Russian soldiers and mercenaries.[10]

Passage[edit]

Most fighters travel to Turkey first before slipping across the border with somewhat lesser contingents coming from Lebanon and even fewer from Jordan and Iraq;[35] many of the fighters also use forged passports as they try to escape secret services. Upon entering the country, many of the Islamist fighters were dispersed to the various groups such as Ahrar ash-Sham and the Nusra Front. Languages reportedly spoken in rebel camps include: Chechen, Tajik, Turkish, French, the Saudi Arabic dialect and Urdu (Pakistan or India). In regards to the Free Syrian Army, The Guardian reported the recruits to be more secretive.[36] Jihadist internet fora have also been fertile recruiting grounds.[35]


Even in July 2013, it was reported that foreign fighters continued to come to Syria and commit atrocities against both supporters and opponents of the government, as well as clashing with moderate rebel groups.[37] This followed President Bashar al-Assad signing into law a bill that would punish anyone entering the country illegally with jail time and a fine. The fine would be between five million and 10 million Syrian pounds.[38]

Islamic State foreign fighters[edit]

According to figures collected by the Soufan Group in 2016, between 27,000 and 31,000 people including women and children who would not normally engage in conflict had traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State and other extremist groups fighting in the region.[39][40]


One reason suggested for the influx of foreigners in the fight is that the Syrian government took no steps to curtail the inflow of foreigners moving into Iraq during the Iraqi insurgency. In the first half of 2012, 700-1,400 fighters were said to have entered Syria.[35] Their numbers continued to increase, however, and by 2013 may have numbered more than 11,000.[41] The Turkish border was how most jihadis entered Syria.[42]


An October 2016 World Bank study found that "ISIL's foreign fighters are surprisingly well-educated."[43] Using the fighters' self-reported educational levels, the study concluded that "69% of recruits reported at least a secondary-level education"[43] of which "a large fraction have gone on to study at university"[44] and also that "only 15% of recruits left school before high school; less than 2% are illiterate."[43][44] The study also found that foreign fighters are often more educated than their countrymen where those "from Europe and in Central Asia have similar levels of education to their countrymen" while those "from the Middle East, North Africa, and South and East Asia are significantly more educated than what is typical in their home nations."[43] The report notes that its conclusions that terrorism is not driven by poverty and low levels of education does not conform with previous research.[43] However, the report did find a strong correlation "between a country's male unemployment rate and the propensity of the country to supply foreign fighters" leading the report to recommend that governments pursue a policy of lowering the unemployment rate among the educated as a counter-terrorism strategy.[43]


In December 2018, Kurdish authorities held 550 foreign women about 1200 in captivity. A large part of the children were born in Syrian territory controlled by the Islamic State. Many of the women still shared the Islamic State ideology and lacked passports and therefore Kurdish authorities were reluctant to release them. While initially the women and children were kept along civilian Syrian refugees, this proved untenable as hard-liners among the women caused problems when they ganged up and assaulted women who took off the Islamic burqa. They also prevented other women and children from listening to music provided by their captors.[45] In October 2019, hundreds of inmates with suspected links to the Islamic State reportedly fled a displacement camp based in north-east Syria, following the Turkish offensive in the region. This raised concerns of resurgence of the Islamic State amid conflict.[46]

Origins of foreign fighters[edit]

Fighters include those from the Gulf Arab States, the Levant, the Maghreb, Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, the Muslim regions of Eastern Africa, the Muslim regions of the Balkans (especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania), the Muslim regions of Russia (especially the North Caucasus region), the Muslim regions of Southeast Asia, and many Western countries.[47] Some jihadist groups are dominated by a single nationality, as is the case with the Caucasus Emirate (Chechens) and the Turkistan Islamic Party (Uyghurs), or the pro-government Afghan Shia Liwa Fatemiyoun.


A 7 December 2015 report by the Soufan Group gave estimates for the number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq by their country and region of origin based on information dated between 2014 and 2015.[48] The study, which only included foreign fighters with the Islamic State, the Nusra Front and other Sunni jihadist factions, listed the countries with the largest number of foreign fighters were Tunisia (6000), Saudi Arabia (2500), Russia (2400), Turkey (2100), Jordan (2000+)[49][48] while the number of fighters by region was reported to be: the Middle East (8240), the Maghreb (8000), Western Europe (5000), former Soviet Republics (4700), Southeast Asia (900), the Balkans (875), and North America (289).[49] Of Western Europe's estimated 5000 total fighters, almost 3700 fighters were produced by just four Western European countries: France (1700), Germany (760), the United Kingdom (760), and Belgium (470).[49][48] Between 2014 and 2015, the report estimated a nearly 300% increase in the number of fighters originating from Russia and Central Asia whereas the total number of fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq had become "relatively flat."[49] The report mentioned that the flow of foreign fighters "is neither uniform by region nor by country," with some countries having distinguishable "Hotbeds of recruitment" with some hotbeds, such as the Lisleby district of Norway's Fredrikstad which is populated by only 6000 people, being small and relatively new while other cities and regions, such as Tunisia's Bizerte and Ben Gardane, Libya's Derna, Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, and Brussel's Molenbeek, "are well-established incubators and radiators of extremist behavior."[48] The Soufan Group reported on 15 October 2016 that there has been "a significant increase in the number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria" since 2014.[50] The U.S. State Department reported on 2 June 2016 that their "intelligence community" estimates that possibly "in excess of 40,000 total foreign fighters have gone to the conflict [in Syria] and from over 100 countries".[51]


The phenomenon causes concerns in the home countries of the foreign fighters. The phenomenon is not new, but the size and variety of origins in this case were unusual.[52]

Afghanistan[edit]

Afghan Shia fighters have had a major presence in Syria on the pro-government side.[77] In 2018, it was reported that 2,000 Afghan had been killed and more than 8000 wounded in Syria in the past five years, fighting for the Liwa Fatemiyoun, composed mainly of members of the Hazarah Afghan minority.[78] The Brigade reportedly had 10,000–20,000 fighters in 2016-2017.[79][80][81]

Azerbaijan[edit]

Azerbaijan has a largely non-observant Shia population with a Sunni minority. Some Sunni citizens of Azerbaijan have joined terrorist organizations in Syria.[82][83][84] The estimated number of Azerbaijanis in Syria ranges from 200 to 300.[85]

Georgia[edit]

According to Georgia's State Security Service, around 50 Georgian citizens, principally from the Kist (Chechen)-populated Pankisi Gorge, had joined the Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq as of June 2016. By June 2017, at least 25 citizens of Georgia have died in these conflicts.[86] A veteran of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and a former sergeant in the Georgian Army, Abu Omar al-Shishani, served as a commander for the Islamic State in Syria.[87][88][89] Another one is Muslim Shishani.[90][91][92]

Central Asia[edit]

In September 2013, a Kazakh and two Kyrgyz returned from Syria and were arrested in Osh on terrorism charges on claims that they were sent to Kyrgyzstan by the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) to perpetrate attacks. In early February 2014, six suspects were arrested in Osh, some of whom were said to have trained in camps in Syria before returning to Kyrgyzstan. They were reportedly planning attacks in Osh and Bishkek. Some Kyrgyz fighters that were known to be in Syria joined the Nusra Front.[152]


A few Kazakhs have joined the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. the Islamic State released a video called "Race Toward Good" showing Kazakh children being trained as fighters.[153] The families of Kazakh fighters have accompanied them to Syria including children and women.[154][155] Many Kazakhs who lived under the Islamic State were women and children who were forcibly brought to Syria. The United Nations presented in 2019 Kazakhstan's repatriation initiative for other countries to model.[156] Families of Azeri and Kazakh members of the Islamic State have been reportedly massacred by the Syrian Islamist rebel group Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki. A Kazakh fighter has appeared in Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar. According to the testimony of a Kazakh student who returned to Kazakhstan from Syria, the Arab Jihadist rebels in Syria were racist against the Kazakhs, assigned them the most difficult duties, and called them "Chinese" and there were little feelings of solidarity among the militants. A new video of Islamic State Kazakh child soldiers being given military training was reported in the media.[157] Kazakh passports were seized by SDF, according to Kurdish sources.[158] The Shadadi emir Abu Khatab al-Kazakhi died in Syria.[159][160] Kazakh and Uzbek the Islamic State members invited entire families form their home countries.[161]


Uzbek foreign fighters in Syria include Imam Bukhari Jamaat (كتيبة الامام البخاري) (Uzbek: Imom al buxoriy katibasi) (Turkish: İmam Buhari Cemaati),[162][163] Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (كتيبة التوحيد والجهاد) (Uzbek: Tavhid va Jihod katibasi) (Turkish: Tevhid ve Cihad Cemaati),[164] and Katibat Sayfulla (كتيبة سيف الله), which is part of the Nusra Front.


Uzbek Jihadist groups reportedly operated four training camps in Syria in 2015.[165]


Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (Тавҳид ва Жиҳод),[166] also called Jannat Oshiklari,[167] is a largely Uzbek group active in northern Syria that was led by Abu Saloh.[168] It participated in the 2015 Northwestern Syria offensive,[169] the Al-Ghab offensive (July–August 2015),[169][170][171] Battle of Aleppo (2012–2016)[172][173][174][175][176][177][178][179][180][181][182][183][184] the Siege of Al-Fu'ah-Kafarya (2015),[185] and the seizure of the Qarmid military camp. It was a former part of the Nusra Front and was reportedly still an ally of the group in 2015.[186]


The Uzbek group Katibat al Imam al Bukhari, also called Imam Bukhari Jamaat,[187] has separate groups in Syria and Adghanistan.[188][189][190][191] It pledged allegiance to the Taliban in 2015.[192][193][194][195] Uzbek foreign fighters have flocked to Katibat Imam al-Bukhari.[196] Salahuddin al-Uzbeki is the leader of Imam Bukhari Jamaat and his son Umar, a 16 year old teenager, died while fighting in Aleppo against the Syrian military.[197][198] A member of Imam Bukhari Jamaat defended the utilization of child soldiers.[199][200] On the VK social networking website, an illustration of a militant aiming an RPG at Santa Claus' flying sleigh was posted by Imam Bukhari Jamaat in 2015.[201] Child soldiers were being drilled by Imam Bukhari Jamaat in 2016.[202] They battled in Aleppo and Latakia's Jabal al Akrad region.[203][204][205][206][207] The group participated in the Siege of al-Fu'ah and Kafriya.[208]


Katibat Sayfulla is part of the Nusra Front.[209] It participated in the Siege of Abu al-Duhur Airbase.[210]


Uzbek fighters in the Islamic State have participated in suicide bombings.[211] Uzbeks make up the Islamic State's Katibat Al-Ghurabaa.[212]


The Islamic State has recruited hundreds of Tajiks from Tajikistan.[213][214][215][216][217][218][219][220]


Once the Central Asians died in battle, their wives were given to other fighters.[221]


70 Uzbeks died in Idlib after a Turkistan Islamic Party site was hit by a missile.[222][223]


Former Soviet countries were sending large numbers of fighters to Syria according to Russia's president Vladimir Putin in 2017.[224] However, data regarding the flow of foreign fighters from Central Asian states remains patchy, with some researchers cautioning against inaccurate reporting, commentary by lobby groups, and think tank reports which are not based on triangulated data.[47]

Former Yugoslavia[edit]

Muslims from the Balkans have joined the opposition in fighting against the Syrian government, and some have been killed.


In 2013, it was reported that many recruits came from Serbia's Muslim-inhabited Sandžak region, particularly the city of Novi Pazar. Several hundred come from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia. Many of the recruits were Salafists and, though denied by some Salafist leaders, Rešad Plojović, the deputy leader of the Sandžak muftiate, said that "some organisations and individuals [are recruiting Balkan Muslims]. There are centers or individuals who probably have connections with certain organisations, and they are motivating people. They also may know ways to transport them to the war zone. Let's be frank. Many here do not even know where Syria is. They cannot know how to go there and get involved in all that is happening there." Anel Grbović, a journalist from Novi Pazar, wrote that most fighters from the Sandžak had been removed from the country's two official Islamic communities before traveling to Syria. "The fact is, there are illegal organisations recruiting people here. The fact is, there are houses where they come together. The fact is, there are facilities where they conduct their religious rituals – which means they exclude themselves from the mosque. That means they exclude themselves from the system of the Islamic community and are more easily influenced by some individuals or organisations." As for Albanian Muslims in Kosovo and Macedonia, they fought for the rebels in order to help "Sunni brothers" in their fight. At least one Macedonian fighter said he was recruited via an intermediary in Vienna. From Bosnia and Herzegovina, many Bosniaks joined the Nusra Front as Salafists (Salafism came to Bosnia during the Bosnian War with Saudi financing, though foreign fighters in that war stayed on in the country despite controversy[225]). Some of relatives of the fighters have said that the leader of the predominantly Salafist Bosnian village of Gornja Maoča, Nusret Imamović, recruited the fighters; however he refused to be interviewed about the allegations. The director of the Bosnian State Investigation and Protection Agency, Goran Zubac, said that his office had questioned at least eight men linked to recruiting and sending the fighters to Syria, while he said his office was monitoring the Salafists. "If our priority is to fight against terrorism and these activities are a part of this sector, then you can rest assured that nobody in the State Investigation and Protection Agency is sleeping."[226]


By April 2015, a total of 232 Kosovo Albanians had gone to Syria to fight with Islamist groups, most commonly the IS.[227] Forty of these are from the town of Skenderaj (Srbica), according to Kosovo police reports.[228] By September 2014, a total of 48 ethnic Albanians from several countries were killed fighting in Syria and Iraq.[229] According to the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, around 60 Kosovar fighters have been killed in combat as of March 2016.[230] As of March 2016, the Albanian Government estimates that over 100 Albanian citizens have joined militant groups in Syria and Iraq, 18 of whom have been killed and 12 wounded.[231]


Macedonian citizens of Albanian descent are also fighting in Syria, and six were reported to have been killed by 2014.[232][233]

Southeast Asia[edit]

Indonesia and Malaysia are the main source of foreign fighters from Southeast Asia with an estimated of 500 Indonesians and 200 Malaysians have travelling to Syria to fight for the Islamic State.[251] It is also suspected that more than 200 Filipinos, mostly the members of Abu Sayyaf (ASG) and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) are training and fighting in Iraq and Syria under Islamic State.[252]


In March 2019, the Malaysian Government has announced that it would allow Malaysian foreign fighters to return provided that they comply with checks and enforcement and complete a one-month government-run rehabilitation programme. This rehabilitation program involves returnees being examined by psychologists and clerics. Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay, the counter-terrorism head of the Malaysian Special Branch, has confirmed that 11 Malaysians have returned including eight men, a woman, and two young children. The men were charged in court and convicted while the woman attended a rehabilitation programme. According to Ayob, 51 Malaysians remain in Syria including 17 children.[253][254]

Pakistan[edit]

In 2013, the Pakistani Taliban said that its fighters, from a variety of countries, were fighting against the Syrian government. They were reportedly working with the Nusra Front and al-Qaeda in Iraq. The group's commanders said that they sought to fight in Syria in order to foster closer links with al-Qaeda's central leadership. An unnamed Taliban commander was quoted by Reuters in 2013 as saying that the group was fighting alongside their Mujahedeen friends: "When our brothers needed our help, we sent hundreds of fighters along with our Arab friends." He added that videos would be released showing the group's "victories" in Syria. Another commander said: "Since our Arab brothers have come here for our support, we are bound to help them in their respective countries and that is what we did in Syria. We have established our own camps in Syria. Some of our people go and then return after spending some time fighting there.[372] The group's spokesman, Abdul Rashid Abbasi, said on 16 July 2013 that its first batch of fighters had arrived in Syria and set up a command and control centre and that another batch of at least 120 fighters were expected to join the others within a week.[373] While a militant said that 100 fighters had reached Syria and another 20 were on the way with an untold number of volunteers waiting, the Foreign Office spokesman Aizaz Chaudhry said: "We have seen these reports in the media and the concerned authorities are verifying these claims by the militants."[374] However, the Istanbul-based Syrian National Council released a statement that read: "We ask for clarification regarding coverage that reflects poorly on the Syrian revolution, particularly news about Taliban's office in Syria and other news items about Islamist fighters." It also cited the Taliban's Shura Council as denying the news and calling it a "rumor." Specifically, Ahmed Kamel said the reports of the Taliban's presence were a "systematic" and "rapid" campaign by pro-government outlets to "smear" the rebels. He said that these were "sick attempts to make the Syrian people look like a bunch of radical Islamists. Syria is bigger than all of these lies and we know, based on our contacts inside Syria, that no Pakistani Taliban are fighting alongside the Syrian rebels. The Taliban want to kill Americans and Israelis, so why they should go to Syria when we are fighting for freedom, democracy and justice against a tyrant?"[375]


In addition, large numbers of Pakistani Shia fighters have fought on the pro-government side, mainly in the Zeinabiyoun Brigade,[77] which has up to 1,000 fighters in Syria.[376] 158 Shia Pakistani fighters were killed in Syria between January 2012 and August 2018.[60]


The Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have shared a list of the names of 29 Pakistanis among who are in their custody for fighting for the Islamic State.[377]

Others[edit]

Reports indicated the inclusion of Khmer people fighting with the Islamic State, including those who studied in madrassas in the Middle East.[343] A Turkish member of the Turkistan Islamic Party, Hudhayfah al-Turki, blew himself up in Aleppo.[378]

Blowback[edit]

Amidst concern of blowback, the first reported case of a former fighter in the conflict to attack those outside Syria occurred in May 2014 at the Jewish Museum of Belgium shooting.[407] Though unconfirmed, the Islamic State reportedly claimed responsibility for the 2014 shootings at Parliament Hill, Ottawa.[408]

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