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Kargil War

The Kargil War, also known as the Kargil conflict,[note (I)] was fought between India and Pakistan from May to July 1999 in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of Control (LoC). In India, the conflict is also referred to as Operation Vijay (Hindi: विजय, lit.'Victory'), which was the codename of the Indian military operation in the region.[19] The Indian Air Force acted jointly with the Indian Army to flush out the Pakistan Army and paramilitary troops from vacated Indian positions along the LoC,[20] in what was designated as Operation Safed Sagar (ऑपरेशन सफेद सागर, lit.'White Sea').

"Operation Vijay (1999)" redirects here. For the 1961 Indian operation, see Annexation of Goa.

The conflict was triggered by the infiltration of Pakistani troops—disguised as Kashmiri militants—into strategic positions on the Indian side of the LoC,[21][22] which serves as the de facto border between the two countries in the disputed region of Kashmir. During its initial stages, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed the involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces,[23][24][25] led by General Ashraf Rashid.[26] The Indian Army, later supported by the Indian Air Force, recaptured a majority of the positions on the Indian side of the LoC; facing international diplomatic opposition, Pakistani forces withdrew from all remaining Indian positions along the LoC.


The Kargil War is the most recent example of high-altitude warfare in mountainous terrain, and as such, posed significant logistical problems for the combatting sides. It also marks one of only two instances of conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states (alongside the Sino-Soviet border conflict). India had conducted its first successful test in 1974; Pakistan, which had been developing its nuclear capability in secret since around the same time, conducted its first known tests in 1998, just two weeks after a second series of tests by India.

Location

Before the Partition of India in 1947, Kargil was a tehsil of Ladakh, a sparsely populated region with diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, living in isolated valleys separated by some of the world's highest mountains. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-1948 concluded with the Line of Control bisecting the Ladakh district, with the Skardu tehsil going to Pakistan (now part of Gilgit-Baltistan).[27] After Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the two nations signed the Simla Agreement promising not to engage in armed conflict with respect to that boundary.[28]


The town of Kargil is located 205 km (127 mi) from Srinagar, facing the Northern Areas across the LOC.[29] Like other areas in the Himalayas, Kargil has a continental climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long and chilly with temperatures often dropping to −48 °C (−54 °F).[30]


An Indian national highway (NH 1) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil. The area that witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 160-kilometre (100 mi) long stretch of ridges overlooking this only road linking Srinagar and Leh. The military outposts on the ridges above the highway were generally around 5,000 m (16,000 ft) high, with a few as high as 5,485 m (17,995 ft).[31] Apart from the district capital, Kargil, the populated areas near the front line in the conflict included the Mushkoh Valley and the town of Drass, southwest of Kargil, as well as the Batalik sector and other areas northeast of Kargil.


Kargil was targeted partly because the terrain was conducive to the preemptive seizure of several unoccupied military positions.[32] With tactically vital features and well-prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, a defender on the high ground would enjoy advantages akin to that of a fortress. Any attack to dislodge a defender from high ground in mountain warfare requires a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders,[33] and the difficulties would be exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures.[34]


Kargil is just 173 km (107 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu, which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani combatants. A road between Kargil and Skardu exists, which was closed in 1949.[35]

World opinion

Pakistan was heavily criticised by other countries for instigating the war, as its paramilitary forces and insurgents had crossed the LOC (Line of Control).[105] Pakistan's primary diplomatic response, one of plausible deniability linking the incursion to what it officially termed as "Kashmiri freedom fighters", was in the end not successful.[106] Veteran analysts argued that the battle was fought at heights where only seasoned troops could survive, so poorly equipped "freedom fighters" would neither have the ability nor the wherewithal to seize land and defend it. Moreover, while the army had initially denied the involvement of its troops in the intrusion, two soldiers were awarded the Nishan-E-Haider (Pakistan's highest military honour). Another 90 soldiers were also given gallantry awards, most of them posthumously, confirming Pakistan's role in the episode. India also released taped phone conversations between the Army Chief and a senior Pakistani general where the latter is recorded saying: "the scruff of [the militants] necks is in our hands",[107] although Pakistan dismissed it as a "total fabrication". Concurrently, Pakistan made several contradicting statements, confirming its role in Kargil, when it defended the incursions saying that the LOC itself was disputed.[108] Pakistan also attempted to internationalise the Kashmir issue, by linking the crisis in Kargil to the larger Kashmir conflict, but such a diplomatic stance found few backers on the world stage.[109]


As the Indian counter-attacks picked up momentum, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif flew to meet US President Bill Clinton on 4 July to obtain support from the United States. Clinton rebuked Sharif, however, and asked him to use his contacts to rein in the militants and withdraw Pakistani soldiers from Indian territory. Clinton would later reveal in his autobiography that "Sharif's moves were perplexing" since the Indian Prime Minister had travelled to Lahore to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the Kashmir problem and "by crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had wrecked the [bilateral] talks".[110] On the other hand, he applauded Indian restraint for not crossing the LOC and escalating the conflict into an all-out war.[111]


G8 nations supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the LOC at the Cologne summit. The European Union also opposed Pakistan's violation of the LOC.[112] China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, insisted on a pullout of forces to the pre-conflict positions along the LOC and settling border issues peacefully. Other organisations like the ASEAN Regional Forum too supported India's stand on the inviolability of the LOC.[109]


Faced with growing international pressure, Sharif managed to pull back the remaining soldiers from Indian territory. The joint statement issued by Clinton and Sharif conveyed the need to respect the LOC and resume bilateral talks as the best forum to resolve all disputes.[113][114]

Artillery

Army Aviation Corps

Army Service Corps

Impact and influence of media

The Kargil War was significant for the impact and influence of the mass media on public opinion in both nations. Coming at a time of exploding growth in electronic journalism in India, the Kargil news stories and war footage were often telecast live on TV, and many websites provided in-depth analysis of the war.[150] The conflict became the first "live" war in South Asia and it was given such detailed media coverage that one effect was the drumming up of jingoistic feelings.[151]


The conflict soon turned into a news propaganda war, in which press briefings given by government officials of each nation produced conflicting claims and counterclaims. The Indian government placed a temporary News Embargo on information from Pakistan, banning the telecast of the state-run Pakistani channel PTV[152] and blocking access to online editions of the Dawn newspaper.[153] The Pakistani media criticised this apparent curbing of freedom of the press in India, while India media claimed it was in the interest of national security. The Indian government ran advertisements in foreign publications including The Times and The Washington Post detailing Pakistan's role in supporting extremists in Kashmir in an attempt to garner political support for its position.


As the war progressed, media coverage of the conflict was more intense in India than in Pakistan.[154] Many Indian channels showed images from the battle zone in a style reminiscent of CNN's coverage of the Gulf War (one of the shells fired by Pakistan troops even hit a Doordarshan transmission centre in Kargil; coverage continued, however).[155] Reasons for India's increased coverage included the greater number of privately owned electronic media in India compared to Pakistan and relatively greater transparency in the Indian media. At a seminar in Karachi, Pakistani journalists agreed that while the Indian government had taken the press and the people into its confidence, Pakistan had not.[156]


The print media in India and abroad was largely sympathetic to the Indian cause, with editorials in newspapers based in the west and other neutral countries observing that Pakistan was largely responsible for the conflict. Some analysts believe that Indian media, which was both larger in number and more credible, may have acted as a force multiplier for the Indian military operation in Kargil and served as a morale booster.[1][157] As the fighting intensified, the Pakistani version of events found little backing on the world stage. This helped India gain valuable diplomatic recognition for its position.

WMDs and the nuclear factor

Since Pakistan and India each had weapons of mass destruction, many in the international community were concerned that if the Kargil conflict intensified, it could lead to nuclear war. Both countries had tested their nuclear capability in 1998 (India conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever nuclear test). Many political pundits believed the tests to be an indication of the escalating stakes in the scenario in South Asia. When the Kargil conflict started just a year after the nuclear tests, many nations desired to end it before it intensified.


International concerns increased when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement on 31 May warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal.[158] This was immediately interpreted as a threat of nuclear retaliation by Pakistan in the event of an extended war, and the belief was reinforced when the leader of Pakistan's senate noted, "The purpose of developing weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed".[159] Many such ambiguous statements from officials of both countries were viewed as warnings of an impending nuclear crisis where the combatants would consider use of their limited nuclear arsenals in "tactical" nuclear warfare in the belief that it would not have ended in mutual assured destruction, as could have occurred in a nuclear conflict between the United States and the USSR. Some experts believe that following nuclear tests in 1998, the Pakistani military was emboldened by its nuclear deterrent to markedly increase coercion against India.[160]


The nature of the India-Pakistan conflict took a more sinister turn when the United States received intelligence that Pakistani nuclear warheads were being moved towards the border. Bill Clinton tried to dissuade Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif from nuclear brinkmanship, even threatening Pakistan of dire consequences. According to a White House official, Sharif seemed to be genuinely surprised by this supposed missile movement and responded that India was probably planning the same. In an article published in a defence journal in 2000, Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, a security expert, claimed while quoting another expert that India too had readied at least five nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles.[161]


Sensing a deteriorating military scenario, diplomatic isolation, and the risks of a larger conventional and nuclear war, Sharif ordered the Pakistani army to vacate the Kargil heights. He later claimed in his official biography that General Pervez Musharraf had moved nuclear warheads without informing him.[162] Recently however, Pervez Musharraf revealed in his memoirs that Pakistan's nuclear delivery system was not operational during the Kargil war;[72] something that would have put Pakistan under serious disadvantage if the conflict went nuclear.


The threat of WMD included chemical and even biological weapons. Pakistan accused India of using chemical weapons and incendiary weapons such as napalm against the Kashmiri fighters. India, on the other hand, showcased a cache of gas masks as proof that Pakistan may have been prepared to use non-conventional weapons. US official and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons determined that Pakistani allegations of India using banned chemicals in its bombs were unfounded.[163]

Aftermath

India

From the end of the war until February 2000, the Indian stock market rose by more than 30%. The next Indian national budget included major increases in military spending.


There was a surge in patriotism, with many celebrities expressing their support for the Kargil cause.[164] Indians were angered by media reports of the death of pilot Ajay Ahuja, especially after Indian authorities reported that Ahuja had been murdered and his body mutilated by Pakistani troops. The war had produced higher than expected fatalities for the Indian military, with a sizeable percentage of them including newly commissioned officers. One month after conclusion of the Kargil War, the Atlantique Incident, in which a Pakistan Navy plane was shot down by India, briefly reignited fears of a conflict between the two countries.


After the war, the Indian government severed ties with Pakistan and increased defence preparedness. India increased its defence budget as it sought to acquire more state of the art equipment.[165] Media reported about military procurement irregularities[166] and criticism of intelligence agencies like Research and Analysis Wing, which failed to predict the intrusions or the identity and number of infiltrators during the war. An internal assessment report by the armed forces, published in an Indian magazine, showed several other failings, including "a sense of complacency" and being "unprepared for a conventional war" on the presumption that nuclearism would sustain peace. It also highlighted the lapses in command and control, the insufficient troop levels and the dearth of large-calibre guns like the Bofors.[167] In 2006, retired Air Chief Marshal, A. Y. Tipnis, alleged that the Indian Army did not fully inform the government about the intrusions, adding that the army chief Ved Prakash Malik, was initially reluctant to use the full strike capability of the Indian Air Force, instead requesting only helicopter gunship support.[168] Soon after the conflict, India also decided to complete the project, previously stalled by Pakistan, to fence the entire LOC.[169]


The end of the Kargil conflict was followed by the 13th Indian General Elections to the Lok Sabha, which gave a decisive mandate to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government. It was re-elected to power in September–October 1999 with a majority of 303 seats out of 545 in the Lok Sabha. On the diplomatic front, Indo-US relations improved, as the United States appreciated Indian attempts to restrict the conflict to a limited geographic area.[170] Relations with Israel—which had discreetly aided India with ordnance supply and materiel such as unmanned aerial vehicles, laser-guided bombs, and satellite imagery—also were bolstered.[171]


The end and victory of the Kargil War is celebrated annually in India as Kargil Vijay Diwas.

is a 1999 episode in the first season of The West Wing which depicts a fictionalised representation of the Kargil conflict.

Lord John Marbury

single, 'Price of Bullets', released in 1999 dealt with the Kargil War.

Pentagram's

(2001), a Hindi movie directed by Dilip Gulati was released in 2001, based on the incident of Kargil conflict.

Shaheed-E-Kargil

(2003), a Hindi movie which depicts many incidents from the war was one of the longest in Indian movie history, running for more than four hours.[221]

LOC: Kargil

(2004), another Hindi movie portraying a fictionalised account of the conflict. Movie critics have generally appreciated the realistic portrayal of characters.[222] The film also received good reviews in Pakistan because it portrays both sides fairly.[223]

Lakshya

Sainika (2002), the Kannada film directed by Mahesh Sukhdhare depicted the life of a soldier with Kargil war as one of the events. Starring C.P.Yogishwar and Sakshi Shivanand.

[224]

(2003), Hindi film directed by Ashwini Chaudhary depicted the life of Anuj Nayyar's parents after his death. Anuj Nayyar was a captain in the Indian army and was awarded Maha Vir Chakra posthumously. Om Puri plays the role of S.K. Nayyar, Anuj's father.

Dhoop

Mission Fateh – Real Stories of Kargil Heroes, a TV series telecast on channel chronicling the Indian Army's missions.

Sahara

Fifty Day War – A theatrical production on the war, directed by , the title indicating the length of the Kargil conflict. This was claimed to be the biggest production of its kind in Asia, budget of Rs. 15 million, involving real aircraft and explosions in an outdoor setting.[225]

Aamir Raza Husain

(2008) – A Malayalam film directed by a former Indian Army Major Ravi (Retd) based on his experience of Kargil War.

Kurukshetra

(2000) – A Pakistani film-drama based on the armed intrusions and struggle of Pakistan army soldiers in the conflict.

Laag

Kargil Kartoons (1999) – With the support of eight leading cartoonists, compiled a collection of cartoons dedicated to the Indian defence forces.[226] He also coordinated Kargil Kartoons (A Collection of Cartoons and a chain of Cartoon Exhibition), the solidarity gesture of drawing on-the-spot cartoons of army men who passing through the New Delhi railway station on their way to Kargil. The cartoons on Kargil War were later exhibited at The Lalit Kala Academy, New Delhi. 25–31 July 1999, followed by the chain exhibition of cartoons at Jaipur, Chandigarh, Patna and Indore.[227]

Shekhar Gurera

(2003) – A film expressing the mixed emotions of 1999 Cricket World Cup celebrations and mourning associated with individual's casualty in the Kargil war.[228]

Stumped

(2011), romantic drama film directed by Pankaj Kapoor, spanned over the period between 1992 and 2002 covering major events.

Mausam

(2020) – An Indian biographical film was based on life of Indian Air Force pilot Gunjan Saxena, the first Indian female air force pilot in combat during Kargil War.[229]

Gunjan Saxena: The Kargil Girl

(2021) – An Indian war film based on life of Indian army captain Vikram Batra, recipient of the Param Vir Chakra.[230]

Shershaah

(2022) an Indian remake of Forrest Gump.

Laal Singh Chaddha

The impact of the war in the sporting arena was visible during the India-Pakistan clash in the 1999 Cricket World Cup, which coincided with the Kargil timeline. The game witnessed heightened passions and was one of the most viewed matches in the tournament.[231]

Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts

Gudiya, Kargil war victim

Prisoner of war

Kambampati Nachiketa

Ashwani Shrotriya. Archived 27 July 2016 at the Wayback Machine, Dainik Bhaskar

"Operation Vijay: Everything You Need To Know In 4 Minutes"

the CCC Kargil Project.

Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil

(RAND Corporation)

Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella

(Center for Contemporary Conflict) (PDF)

War in Kargil

Archived 12 July 2009 at the Wayback Machine

Essay on the outcomes of the Kargil War

(2004). The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-1502-1.

Stephen P. Cohen

Kargil Review Committee (2000). From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report. SAGE Publications.  0-7619-9466-1. (Executive summary of the report, Online)

ISBN

ACDIS Occasional Paper by Suba Chandran, Published 2004 by Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois.

Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests?

by Shaukat Qadir, RUSI Journal, April 2002

An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999

V.P. Malik (2006). Kargil; From Surprise to Victory. Harper Collins, New Delhi, India.

M.K. Akbar (1999). Kargil Cross Border Terrorism. South Asia Books.  81-7099-734-8.

ISBN

(2001). A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999. Motibagh Palace, Patiala. ASIN B0006E8KKW.

Amarinder Singh

(1999). Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir. South Asia Books. ISBN 81-86019-22-7.

Jasjit Singh

(2002). India–Pakistan in War & Peace. Books Today. ISBN 0-415-30472-5.

J.N. Dixit

Ranjan Kumar Singh (2006). Sarhad Zero Mile. Parijat Prakashan.  81-903561-0-0.

ISBN

. Counterinsurgency, Democracy and the Politics of Identity in India. Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series.

Mona Bhan

Kapila, Subhash (12 October 2007). . South Asia Analysis Group. Archived from the original on 12 October 2007. Retrieved 25 May 2018.<

"Pakistan's Lessons from its Kargil War (1999): An Analysis"

Media related to Kargil War at Wikimedia Commons

Indian Armed Forces site on Kargil

BBC

Impact of the conflict on civilians

Full list of gallantry awards (India) - page 106-118